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Confronted with a financial crisis, governments  the dependence of banks on their bad borrowers.
in many developing countries protect their banks  Banks and their depositors (or an important
from bankruptcy by allocating resources to the  subset of them) should be protected to avoid the
least efficient debtors --  loss-making firms  monetary effects of a banking panic.  But bank
whose bankruptcy would lead to the failure of  shareholders and managers should take their
the banking system. This crowds out efficient  share of the lIsses  - the shareholders by losing
activities that could lead to economic recovery.  their investment (through writeoffs) and the
managers by being removed from their posi-
Such misallocations of resources, and the  tions.
destabilizing macroeconomic forces they gener-
ate, will delay economic recovery until losses  Restructurings of banks should be used to
are allocated in a way that mimics bankruptcy  bring about restructuring in the real sector,  the
processes.  failure of unviable firms (by foreclosing on the
collateral and selling off assets) or the forced re-
The financial system should be restructured  structuring of troubled but viable firms.
to curtail (through writeoffs and recapitalization)
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This paper  analyzes  the  problems  that  financial  distress  causes  in
the  allocational  efficiency  and  macroeconomic  stability  of  developing  countries
and then  explores  some  of the  possib'le  solutions.  A country  is considered  in
financial  distress  when the liabilities  of institutions  accounting  for  a sub-
stantial  portion  of the  banking  system  exceed  the  value  of their  corresponding
assets  to such  an extent  that  the  banking  system's  income  is  not  sufficient  to
cover its expenditures.' The analysis  is centered  on the domestic  side of
financial  distress,  which,  in  several  countries,  is  associated  with  large  external
debts  and  lack  of  access  to  international  credit  and  capital  markets. Although
most of the examples  used in the paper  refer to that set of countries,  the
analysis  can  be extended  to the  many  other  countries  where  domestic  financial
systems  are  strained  although  the  international  credit  position  of the  country
is still  within  reasonable  limits.
The  paper  argues  that  financial  distress  leads  to inefficient  allo-
cation  of real  resources  and  generates  destabilizing  macroeconomic  forces  that
delay  economic  recovery. Financial  distress  produces  such  results  by creating
an important  rigidity  in  the  allocation  of  resources,  which,  regardless  of the
prevailing  set  of  relative  prices,  leads  resources  to  be  allocated  to  inefficient
enterprises. This rigidIty  is the tendency  of banks to keep on allocating
resources  to  loss-making  debtors. Banks  do this  to  ensure  that,  at least  in  the
short-run,  such  debtors  would  not  gc  bankrupt,  causing  the  failure  of  the  banks
themselves. This perverse  allocatior  of resources  crowds  out the efficient
activities  that  could  lead  the  economic  recovery.
Macroeconomic  instabil 4ty sets in,  or is aggravated,  when central
banks  provide  sustained  liquidity  assistance  to  a financial  system  that  can  no
longer  continue  financing  loss-makers  and  starts  to  have illiquidity  problems.
The  increased  monetary  creation  results  in  either  balance-of-payments  problems,
higher  rates of inflation  or both.  Alternatively,  governments  may increase
protection  to  loss-making  activities  to  artificially  increase  their  profitability.
1  Usually,  banks  do  not  reflect  such  situation  on their  books  beceuse  the"  tend
to overstate  asset  values  when in  financial  distress.2
Inefficient  activities  be  profit  able  again  and  the  portfolio  of  banks  improves.
But  only  for  a short  wh'.  because  the  set  of relative  prices  needed  to  cause
those  effects  further  pena  zes  efficient  activities,  setting  the  country  in  an
unsustainable  path.
These  effects  are  the  result  of the  lack  of a mechanism  to  allocate
the  losses  in  the  economy. Such  mechanism  exists  naturally  in  market  economies.
Firms  that  cannot  repay  their  debts  go  bankrupt,  and  so  do their  bankers. The
flow to inefficient  activities  is terminatec.  liberating  resources  for newly
competitive  activities.  Most  governments,  however,  would  not  allow  their  banking
systems  to fail,  and rightly  so  because  the  damaging  effects  of such failure
could  be extremely  traumatic  and long  lasting. So, they  choose  to ignore  the
losses  accumulated  in  the  banking  system  and,  when  these  losses  cannot  be  ignored,
they  provide  unrestricted  liquidity  support  to  banks. Banks  continue  to  allocate
to their  worst  borrowers  the  resources  transferred  by the  central  bank or the
government.
The  main  argument  of the  paper  is  that  the  inefficient  allocation  of
resources  that  accompanies  financial  distress,  and  the  destabilizing  macroeconomic
forces  it generates,  will continue  to delay  economic  recovery  in financially
distressed  countries  until an explicit  process  for allocating  the losses  is
carried  out  in  ways that  mimic  the  bankruptcy  processes  of the  past. That is,
the  financial  system  should  be restructured  in  such  a  way that  their  dependence
on their  bad borrowers  is curtailed  through  writeoffs  and recapitalization.
Banks,  and  their  depositors  (or  an  important  subset  of  them),  should  be  protected
because  the  monetary  effects  of  a  banking  panic  should  be avoided.  However,  the
shareholders  and  managers  of banks  should  take  their  share  of the  losses,  the
former  by losing  their  investment  (through  the  writeoffs)  and  the  latter  by  being
removed  from  their  positions.
Banks'  restructuring  makes  sense  only when coupled  with a similar
restructuring  of the  real  sector,  comprising  the  failure  of  unviable  firms  and
restructuring  of  viable  but troubled  firms. The  restructuring  of banks  can  be
used to cause  the restructuring  of the real sector  through  forcing  banks to
writeoff  their  bad loans.  This will lead  banks to either  foreclose  on the
collateral  and  sell  the  real  assets  for  what  they  can  get  or  force  the  restructuring
of the  debtor  firms,  depending  on the  viability  of  borrowers.
The institutional  arrangements  that  can  be used for these  restruc-
turings,  and the  macroeconomic  implications  of both carrying  and  not carrying
them  out  are  developed  in  the  main  body  of the  paper.3
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.1  A ccuntry  is considered  in financial  distress  when the liabilities
of  institutions  accounting  for  a  substantial  portion  of  the  banking  system  exceed
the  value of their  corresponding  assets  to such an extent  that the banking
system's  income  is  not  sufficihnt  to  cover  its  expenditures.  This  situation  is
not  eaL  ily  recognizable  by  inspecting  the  banks'  books  because,  when  in  distress,
banks  tend  to  overstate  asset  values. In  most  cases,  financial  distress  can  be
diagnosed  only  through  indirect  means,  looking  for  certain  symptoms  that  accompany
it. Some  of  these  symptoms,  such  as  extremely  high  real  interest  rates  prevailing
for  prolonged  periods  and large  central  banks'  losses,  a-i described  in this
paper.  The  diagnostic  can  then  be  conf  irmed  with  a  serious  review  of  the  portfolio
of  the  banking  system,  which  is  possible  only  in  countries  where  the  government
has  decided  to  confront  the  issues  raised  by  the  solution  of  a financial  crisis.
1.2  Financial  problems  are frequently  classified  in two categories,
insolvency  and  liquidity  problems.  Insolvency  exists  when  the  discounted  present
value  of the  income  generated  by  assets  is  smaller  than  that  of the  liabilities.
Liquidity  problems  are temporary  when they  arise  exclusively  from  liabilities
having  shorter  maturities  than  assets.  But,  illiquidity  is  sometimes  the  result
of  insolvency.  For  the  purposes  of  this  paper,  liquidity  problems  are  considered
as manifestations  of financiai  distress  only when they are originated  from
insolvency.
1.3  A certain  de 6ree  of  financial  distress  is  always  present  in  an  economy
as a result  of two  main factors:  new  ventures  that fail  to  become  profitable,
and  old  businesses  that  were  profitable  but start  to  make  losses  as  a result  of
market  changes. Such  failures  are  positive  to the  extent  that  they  reflect  the
continuous  experimentation  and renovation  of an economy  in expansion.  The
financial  distress  of individual  firms  turns  into  a  national  problem,  however,
when a substantial  portion  of the installed  capacity  in the country  becomes
unprofitable,  causing  a  serious  deterioration  of  the  banking  system's  portfolio.
1.4  Underlying  generalized  insolvency  situations  is  a  substantial  capital
loss  that  someone  will  have  to  pay  for,  however  ingenious  the  financial  solution
that  is found. In the  past,  the  allocation  of a  catastrophic  loss  was  carried
out in a straightforward  way: the  inability  of debtors  to service  their  debts
led  both them  and their  bankers  to  bankruptcy. Bankruptcy  effectively  solved
the  financial  problems  by  extinguishing  the  obligations  that  could  not  be  repaid.
The  underlying  causes  of financial  problems  were  also  removed  since  inefficient
activities  and  firms,  those  that  could  not  service  their  debts,  ceased  to  exist,
liberating  resources  for  economic  growth.4
1.5  Presently,  mechanisms  to prevent  banks from going  bankrupt  are in
place  in  most  countries.  The  existence  of these  mechanisms  is  a  mixed  blessing.
On the  one  hand,  they  prevent  banking  panics  with  their  dire  consequences;  but
on the other  hand, if they  are not properly  designed,  they  may also  prevent
market  forces  from  solving  financial  problems  by immediately  eliminating  inef-
ficient  activities  and their  obligations.  Confronted  with a financial  crisis,
governments  in  many  developing  countries  protect  their  banks  from  bankruptcy  by
allocating  resources  to loss-making  firms  whose  bankruptcy  would lead to the
failure  of the  banking  system.
1.6  Such allocation  of resources  has taken two forms:  (a) attempting
artificially  to restore  the  profitability  of loss-making  firms,  by introducing
quantitative  restrictions  to  trade,  price  controls  and  other  direct  interventions
in the price structure;  and, (b)  when a shift in relative  prices  has been
inevitable,  granting  loss-making  firms  preferential  access  to  resources,  including
credit  and  foreign  exchange,  frequently  at subsidized  prices.
1.7  The  main argument  of this  paper  is that  this  inefficient  allocation
of resources,  and the destabilizing  macroeconomic  forces  it generates,  will
continue  to delay  economic  recovery  in  financially  distressed  countries  until
an  explicit  process  for  allocating  the  losses  is  carried  out  in  ways  that  mimic
the  bankruptcy  processes  of the  past.  Chapter  II discusses  the international
and  domestic  origins  of  the  financial  distress  now  affecting  much  of  the  developing
world. After  considering  the  general  problems  encountered  in  the  stabilization
of a distorted  economy,  Chapter  III  examines  the  economic  effects  of financial
distress,  focusing  on the rigidity  that it introduces  in the allocation  of
resources. Chapter  IV discusses  the  rationale  for  government  intervention  in
solving financial crises, the shapes this intervention  may take and the
macroeconomic  implications.  Chapter  V deals  with the  institutional  aspects  of
various  solutions  and  proposes  a  strategy  for  the  restructuring  of  the  financial
and  nonfinancial  sectors. Chapter  VI summarizes  the  conclusions  of the  paper.
II.  ORIGINS  OF  THE  CURRENT  FINANCIAL  CRISES
2.1  Overborrowing  is frequently  cited  as the  main cause of financial
distress. Ex-post,  this is a truism. Ex-ante,  however,  if overborrowing  is
accepted  as  a  cause,  it  is  necessar-y  to  explain  why  rational  agents  borrow  beyond
their  repayment  capacity  and  why  rational  bankers  lend  to  them.  In  many  countries,
the  structure  of incentives  is  such  that governments  and  public  enterprises  do
not  have  checks  on  their  deficits  and  will  borrow  as  much  as  they  can.  Domestically,
governments  can  force  the  financing  of  those  deficits.  internationally,  however,
they have to convince  foreign  bankers to lend the money to them.  Private5
entrepreneurs  always  have to  convince  bankers  that  they  represent  a good  risk.
Why  should  bankers  voluntarily  lend  to  either  governments  or  private  agents  when
it is  clear  that  they  will  not  be aole  to  repay?
2.2  As it is discussed  later,  it is only when financial  distress  has
settled  in that  average  borrowers  have incentives  to  keep on  borrowing  beyond
their  means,  and  that  average  bankers  have  incentives  to  lend  to  them,  pretending
that  insolvent  borrowers  are solvent. Before  that  stage,  the  explanation  for
overborrowing  is  that  these  borrowers  looke solvent  at  the  time  of the  lending
but  turned  to  be insolvent  afterwards  as  a  result  of  shifts  in  the  profit- lity
of their  activities.  Thus,  the  relevant  question  is  why sudden  shift  a  the
profitability  of  borrowers  take  place. 2
2.3  Shifts  in the  profitability  of borrowers,  and  therefore  widespread
financial  distress,  generally  can  be  traced  to  drastic  changes  in  relative  prices.
Such  changes  result  in  serious  misalignments  between  the  existing  allocation  of
resources  and  that  which  would  be consistent  with  the  new  structure  of relative
prices. Changes  in  relative  prices  drastic  enough  to  render  unprofitable  a  large
portion  of  a  country's  production  capacity  are  always  related  in  some  way  either
to shifts  in a country's  terms  of trade  or to the abrupt  end of a long and
sustained  misalignment  between  domestic  and  international  relative  prices.
2.4  Two  other  factors  help  to  generate  financial  distress. The  first  is
a  sudden  shift  in  the  attitude  of  international  lenders  toward  a  country,  which,
although  normally  caused  by terms  of trade  changes,  also  adds  to  the  effect  of
these changes by precluding  the use of  international  credit to ease the
balance-of-payments  problems.  The  second  is  a  misallocation  of  resources  caused
by political  lending,  linkages  between  banks  and  borrowers,  and  corruption.
2.5  Countries  experiencing  financial  distress  fall  into  two  broad  cate-
gories  in accordance  with the  main factors  that  led  to the  weakening  of their
banking  systems. In the first  set  of countries,  the  portfolio  of the  banking
system  deteriorated  gradually  as  a  result  of  the  prolonged  allocation  of  resources
to  activities  that  are  not  profitable  even  in  relative  price  structures  that  are
highly  distorted  in favor  of the  loss-making  enterprises. Countries  in South
Asia  are  in  this  category. In  the  second  set  of  countries,  the  portfolio  of  the
2 Later,  it is  argued  that  the  existence  of ownership  linkages  between  bankers
and  borrowers  creates  an incentive  for  bankers  to increase  their  exposure  in
related  companies  beyond  prudent  limi...  Except  in cases  of straightforward
fraud,  however,  even  these  arrangements  *e created  with  expectations  of  success,
and turn  sour later  on.  As in the  general  case,  willful  overborrowing  takes
place  only  after  distress  has settled  in.6
banking  system  suffered  a  sudden  deterioration  as  a result  of the  depression  of
international  commodity  prices  that  started  in  the  early  1980s. Most  of Latin
America  and  Africa,  and  some  Eastern  European  countries,  are  in this  category.
2.6  Financial  distress  is  more  pronounced  in  the  second  set  of countries
because  their  domestic  relative  prices  were  deeply  affected  by the  negative  turn
in their  terms  of trade.  Furthermore,  most of these  countries  had acquired
sizable  external  debts  during  the commodities  price  boom of the late 1970s.3
When commodity  prices  collapsed,  the burden  of these  debts  became  excessive
overnight  and  international  banks  stopped  lending  to them.
2.7  The  different  way  in  which  financial  distress  started  in  the  two  sets
of  countries  has  elicited  different  responses  from  economic  agents. Because  cf
the  complication  of the  large  external  debt,  and  because  of the  dramatic  nature
of  the  shock  to  the  banking  system,  people  in  the  second  set  of  countries  rapidly
became  aware  that  the  banking  system  was  in  difficulty  and  adapted  their  behavior
to  that  knowledge.  In  countries  where  the  deterioration  of  the  banks'  portfolio
has  been  gradual,  people  are  not  conscious  of  the  weakness  of  the  banking  system,
and  therefore  have  not  yet  reacted  to it.
2.8  The  behavior  of  people  has  created  a qualitative  difference  between
the  two  sets  of  countries bec-ase  people  tend  to react  to  the  knowledge  of the
insolvency  of  the  banking  system  in  ways  that  increase  financial  distress. Fear
of  bank failures  led  to  capital  flight,  which  made it  more  difficult  for  banks
to  mobilize  resources  and  increase  real  interest  rates,  worsening  the  financial
condition  of  debtors. Also,  the  widespread  existence  of  financial  difficulties
created  bail-out  expectations  and  caused  a relaxation  of financial  discipline
which,  in  turn,  further  increased  the  banks'  insolvency  problems.  In  the  countries
where  financial  distress  is  more  acute,  it  was  these  changes  in  the  behavior  of
economic  agents  that  turned  financial  difficulties  into  financial  crisis.
2.9  This paper is centered  on financial  crisis.  Financial  distress,
however,  is  progressive.  The  more  losses  banks  suffer,  the  less  is  their  ability
to  generate  income  because  they  command  less  resources  to  reinvest.  Hence,  this
discussion  has  relevance  for  financially  distressed  countries  where  the  insolvency
problems  of the  banking  system  are not  yet critical. If not corrected,  the
currert  problems  of these  countries  will  become  a financial  crisis.
3 In the  case  of the  oil-exporting  countries,  the  boom ended  only  in the  early
1980s.i
A. INTERNATIONAL  CAUSES  OF FINANCIAL  DISTRESS
2.10  The countries  suffering  the  most pronounced  financial  distress  are
those  that borrowed  so  heavily  during  the  1970s  that  they  were  unable  to  service
their  external  debts fully in the early 1980s.  These  countries'  excessive
external  borrowing  was  in  part  a  re_ult  of  tl'e  unprecedented  international  shocks
of the  past decade. However,  the  fact  that  there  are  war.y  countries  that  did
not  become  entangled  in debt  problems  shows  that,  althourn  international  cir-
cumstances  helped  to  shape  the  crisis,  it  was  domestic  policy  that  precipitated
financial  distress.
The  Demise  of the  Bretton  Woods  Internationa.  Monetary  Framework
2.11  The  stable  world  economic  envirornment  that  prevailed  after  World  War
LI  came  to  an end  in  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s,  when  the  rates  of inflation
of OECD  countries  started  to diverge  significantly,  creating  misalignments  in
the  exchange  rates  that  led  tc  'requent  and  substantial  devaluations,  rendering
impractical  the fixed-exchange-rate  international  monetary  system  created  at
Bretton  Woods.  In response  to those  problems,  the Bretton  Woods system  was
replaced  in 1973  with the  current  floating-exchange-rate  system. At the  time
the  new  system  was  introduced,  it  was  believed  that  movements  in  exchange  rates
were  going  to  be  determined  primarily  by  purchasing  power  parities,  thus  becoming
predictable  as  a  function  of  a  country's  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.  Exchange
rates,  however,  have  continued  to  fluctuate  in  violent  and  unpredictable  swings,
causing  international  greater  financial  shocks  than  in  previous  decades.
The  Rise  and  Fall  of International  Commodity  Prices
2.12  The  fluctuations  in  commodity  prices  of tle  past  decade  combined  with
the factors  mentioned  above  to generate  marked  cycles  in the  current  account
balances  of  both  oil-  and  non-oil  exporting  countries. The  increased  revenues
accruing  to  ofl-exporting  developing  countrLes  spilled  over  their  boundaries  and
created  an unprecedented  liquidity  in the  international  banks. This  liquidity
did  not  find  an  outlet  in  the  developed  countries,  which  at  the  time  were  pursuing
contractionary  policies to finance  their larger  oil bills.  Consequently,
international  banks  turned  to financing  the  trade  deficits  of those  developing
countries  that  were  attempting  to  overcome  the  contractionary  effects  of  the  oil
price increases  through  expansionary  domestic  demand  policies.  On average,
non-oil  developing  countries  incurred  current  account  deficits  that  approximately
mirrored  the  surpluses  of the  oil-exporting  ones (Figure  1).8
FIGURE 1
THE OIL  PRICE CYCLE
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Source:  International  Finance  Statistics  (IFS),  various  issues.
2.13  The  large  current  account  deficits  of  the  now  overindebted  countries
were also  a result  of the temporary  increase  in non-oil  commodity  prices  that
took  place  in  the  mid-1970s,  which  improved  their  terms  of trade  right  after  the
first  oil  shock  (Figure  2). The  price  cycle  of  non-oil  commodities  had  a  negative
effect  on the finances  of their  exporters  because  it initially  raised  their
export  revenues,  reducing  the  need  for adjustment  to the first  oil shock  and
increasing  their  propensity  to  borrow  abroad. The  subsequent  fall  in  the  terms
of  trade  forced  an  even  more  drastic  adjustment  on  them,  with the  complications
brought  about  by the  increased  stock  of foreign  debt.  The swing  in the  terms
of trade  was most pronounced  in the  Latin  American  countries,  where  the  debt
problems  tended  to  concentrate  (Figure  2).
2.14  The  fall  in oil  prices  in the  early  1980s  completed  a price  cycle
that  closely  resembles  the  shorter  cycle  of  other  commodities  (Figure  1,  above).
Although  the  oil  price  fall  has  been less  pronounced  than  that  of the  rest  of
commodities,  several  oil-exporting  countries  have  experienced  the same  diffi-
culties  as  the  non-oil  exporting  countries  because  they  also  expanded  their  level
of expenditures  on the assumption  that oil  prices  would  never  come down and
borrowed  heavily  to finance  ambitious  so-ial  and  economic  plans.  Starting  in
1981,  oil-exporting  developing  countries  have  been  experiencing  current  account9
FIGURE  2
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Source:  International  Finance  Statistics  (JFS),  various  issues.
deficits  that are increasingly  difficult  to finance. As a result,  the most
distressed  group of international  borrowers  includes  both oil- and non-oil
exporting  countries.
International  Interest  Rate  Fluctuations
2.15  International  instability  was  further  compounded  by fluctuations  in
both  nominal  and real interest  rates  in the  late 1970s  and  early  1980s.  The
rapidly  increasing  world inflation  of the  mid- and  late 1970s  raised  nominal
international  interest  rates  while  depressing  them in real terms  (Figure  3),
creating  a perverse  set of incentives  that encouraged  heavy  borrowing.  The
rising  nominal  rates  increased  the  need  for  liquidity,  while  the  negative  real
interest  rates  encou_aged  the  use  of  credit  to  meet  that  need. As  world  inflation
declined  in  the  early  1980s,  however,  real  interest  rates  rose  to  record  levels,
substantially  increasing  the  burden  of the  debt  service.10
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Source: International Finance Statistics (IFS),  various issues.
B.  DOMESTIC POLICIES
2.16  Domestic  policies  contributing  to financial  crisis  were a combination
of  long-term,  inward-oriented  development  strategies  and  short-term  macroeconomic
policies.  These policies resulted in  macroeconomic imbalances  that  were severe
enough to  cause serious  f  inancial  problems  to average  economic  agents, including
borrowers and financial intermediaries, even those managed prudently.  These
problems  ware  exacerba.ted  by inadequate  banking  regulation  and  supervision,  which
allowed banks to engage in imprudent financial  practices and failed to correct
financial problems before they exploded.  Such policies set the conditions for
the current financial crisis.
Protectionism and the Rate of Growth of Mominal Domestic Demand
2.17  Countries pursuing inward-oriented development strategies are par-
ticularly vulnerable to financial crises.  In such countries, the industrial
sector developed to service the domestic market under the artificial relative
prices created  by high levels  of  protection,  and did  not generate  enough foreign
exchange to pay for its imported inputs, which had  to be purchased with the
proceeds of commodity exports.  The distorted relative prices that made the
protected  activities  profitable  were  sustainable  only  as  long  as  commodity  exports
were able to finance the purchase of imported inputs.11
2.18  As these  countries  continued  to invest  in inward-oriented,  import-
intensive  industries,  the  surplus  from the often  newlected  commodity  exports
declined  and the countries'  ability  to expand  with their  own resources  was
diminished. Furthermore,  their  capacity  to adjust  to  negative  turns  in their
terms  of trade  by reducing  imports  was impaired  because  it  would  have led to
decreases  not  only  in  consumption  but  in  production  as  well. Since  inward-oriented
policies  also  discouraged  exports,  in  practice  they  reduced  the  overall  ability
of countries  to  adjust  to external  shocks.
2.19  Through  these  effects,  inward-oriented  strategies  cr'ated  structural
pressure -o  pursue  expansionary  macroeconomic  policies. Given  the  dependence
of ecorn-ic  growth  on a growing  domestic  market,  the governments  of the  now
overindebted  countries  were  hard pressed  to maintain  high rates  of growth  of
nominal  domestic  demand,4  even in times  when macroeconomic  stability  demanded
contractionary  policies.  Also,  they  were  pressed  to  count  ract  the  contractionary
effects  of  international  events,  such  as  the  1973-74  oil  price  increases.  These
pressures  resulted  in  the  application  of  highly  expansionary  policies  throughout
the  1970s,  initially  in an attempt  to shield  their  economies  against  the  con-
tractionary  effects  of  the  oil  crises,  and  later  to  take  advantage  of  the  commodity
boom  to  attain  high  rates  of  economic  growtn. Such  policies  not  only  maintained
through  the  1970s  the  rates  of  growth  of  nominal  domestic  demand  that  had  prevailed
in the  1960s  but increased  them  significantly  (Figure  4).
4 The  term "nominal  domestic  demand"  is  used in this  paper  to  mean the  sum  of
consumption  and  investment  at  current  prices. It is  used interchangeably  with
nominal  absorption  and total  nominal  expenditures.12
FIGURE  4
NOMINAL  DOMESTIC  DEMAND  GROWTH  IN  THE  1970s
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Note: The sample  comprises  the 17  Baker countries. The rate  of growth  of  nominal
domestic  demand (NDD)  was estimated  by first  expressing  NDD for  each country  and
each year as a multiple of the 1965 NDD, which resulted in a uniform index for
all countries; next, adding the indices for each year; and finally estimating
tche  rate of growth of the combined index.  This procedure gives an equal  weight
to  each  country  in the  final  result,  regardless  of  the size  of  the country  and
tche  unit of account used to express its NDD.
Source: International Finance Statistics (IFS),  various issues.
The Trade-off Between External and Internal Balance
2.20  The policy  mix chosen by the overindebted  countries,  namely  high  rates
of expansion of nominal domestic demand and currency overvaluation, created a
trade-off between internal  and external balance: countries were able to attain
one  but  not both. In  the  mid-  and  late  1970s,  when the  foreign  exchange  constraint
was not binding, the rate of inflation tended to decline because excess demand
was turned into large  current  account deficits.  In the early  1980s,  when import
restrictions were applied, the excess nominal expenditures (which  were causing13
the  external  imbalance  in  the  previous  years)  turned  toward  domestic  suppliers,
while  real  production  was  falling  because  of  lack  of  imported  inputs.  The  outlet
for  excess  nominal  expenditures  was increased  inflation.
2.21  Figure  5 shows the case of Costa  Rica,  where,  as a result  of the
economy's  dependence  on imported  inputs,  the  rate  of growth  of GDP  has tended
to fluctuate  in inverse  proportion  to the ratio  of the trade  deficit  to GDP.
The  correlation  of the  rate  of inflation  with  the  rate  of expansion  of nominal
domestic  demand  was lost during  1975-80,  when the country  was running  large
current  account  deficits,  but reappeared  when external  financing  for trade
deficits topped.
FIGURE  5
TRADE-OFF  BETWEEN  EXTERNAL  AND  DOMESTIC  BALANCE
IN  COSTA  RICA
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Source:  International  Finance  Statistics  (IFS),  various  issues.
Currency  Overvaluation
2.22  Inward-oriented  strategies  created  pressures  to overvalue  the  local
currencies  as a way to reduce  the inflationary  impact  of excessive  rates  of
growth  of domestic  demand. Those  pressures  were  added  to the  ones  exerted  by
external  events. Currencies  of countries  experiencing  export  booms,  which  in
the  mid-1970s  included  most  of the  countries  now  overindebted  and  especially  the
oil-exporting  ones,  tended  to appreciate  to levels  that,  although  appropriate
to ach-.eve  external  balance  during  the  buom,  proved  to be overvalued  from a14
longer-term  perspective.  This  phenomenon,  which  tends  to occur  whenever  there
is  a sudden  and  large  inflow  of  foreign  exchange,  is  quite  negative  because  the
currency  overvaluation  reduces  or eliminates  the profitability  of activities
other  than  the  booming  ones. The  original  relative  profitabilities  are  restored
when the  export  boom ends,  but  by that  time  several  of the  enterprises  in the
non-booming  sectors  may  be  bankrupt  and  excessive  resources  may  have  been  invested
in the  booming  ones.
2.23  To avoid  currency  appreciation  in these  circumstances, 5 governments
could  hive  encouraged  both  imports  and  investment  abroad  by reducing  protection
and discouraging  capital  inflows.  These  measures  would have dissipated  the
inflationary  impact  of the  foreign  exchange  inflcws  by maintaining  equilibrium
in the  balance  of payments  at the  original  exchange  rate,  thus reducing  the
danger  of overvaluation. 6 Most of the  now overindebted  countries  preferred,
however,  to use the export  boom not to reduce  protection  but to promote  the
growth  of their  protected  industries.  Therefore,  they  followed  policies  that
appreciated  their  currencies  to  levels  higher  than  those  warranted  by  the  improved
terms  of trade. The  result  was  not  balanced  external  accounts  but  large  trade
and  current  account  deficits. Figure  6 shows  how the  capital  flows  to the  17
Baker  countries  increased  as their  currencies  appreciated.
2.24  In some of these countries,  the currency tended to appreciate
excessively  because  governments  maintained  redundant  protection;'  in others,
5 Even  in  open,  nonprotected  economies,  monetary  action  may  be required  to  avoid
the  acceleration  of inflation  when  there  are  sudden  inflows  of  foreign  exchange.
Switzerland,  for  example,  has imposed  taxes  on deposits  from  abroad  when,  as a
result  of international  imbalances,  the country  has experienced  inordinately
large  capital  inflows. In  the  early  1970s,  these  taxes  rendered  the  Swiss  Franc
deposit  rates  of Swiss  banks  negative  in nominal  terms.  Another  example  is
Japan,  which  for  decades  was  able  to  avoid  the  appreciation  of its  currency  by
encouraging  investment  abroad.
6  Normal  frictions  tend  to  result  in  lags  between  the  increase  in  nominal  domestic
demand  and  the  increase  in imports  and  capital  outflows. As a result  of these
lags,  a  certain  degree  of  macroeconomic  instability  was  probably  unavoidable  for
commodity-exporting  countries  as a result  of the  commodity  booms  of the  1970s.
7  Tariff  protection  allows  domestic  producers  to  increase  their  prices  up to  the
sum  of the  CIF  international  price  plus  the  tariff. In  several  cases,  this  sum
is so  high that  domestic  producers  sell  their  products  at less than  what they
could  charge  on account  of the  tariff. The  excess  of the  price  made  possible
by the  tariff  over  the  actual  price  charged  is  called  "redundant  protection"  or
"water  in the tariffs."  Redundant  protection  allows  domestic  producers  of
tradables  to  increase  their  prices  without  fearing  competition  from  abroad  even
when  the  currency  is  appreciating.15
FIGURE  6
REAL EXCHANGE  RATES
AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS IN 17
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Note:  The sample  comprises  the  17 Baker  countries. The  real  exchange  rate  has
been estimated relative to the  U.S. Dollar  because most of the external debt of
developing  countries  is  denominated  in  that  currency.
Source:  International  Finance  Statistics  (IFS),  various  issues.
governments  took  direct  action  to appreciate  the  currency  by either  fixing  the
nominal  exchange  rate  or  reducing  the  rate  of  nominal  devaluation  to  levels  below
the difference  between  domestic  and international  inflation.  Overvaluation
caused  severe  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  seriously  distorted  the  allocation
of resources.
2.25  Domestic  Relative  Prices:  Overvaluation  turned  domestic  relative
prices  in  favor  of  nontradables.  This  turn  had  a  great  effect  in  the  allocation
of both real  and financial  resources. Export  activities  became  depressed  and
some  of  them  experienced  serious  financial  problems.  In  countries  with  redundant
protection  to industry,  industrial  enterprises  working  for  the  domestic  market
initially  behaved  as  nontradables  because  of  the  excess  protection.  The  spillover
of  domestic  demand  allowed  industrialists  to  increase  their  prices  at  the  overall
inflation  rate while  the overvalued  exchange  rate resulted  in lower  imported
input  prices.  This created  an initial  boom in import-substituting  industry,
which  attracted  resources. However,  continued  overvaluation  eventually  eroded16
redundant  protection,  and  import-substitutlng  firms  joined  exporters  in  recession.
As tradable  activities  became  less  profitable,  resources  were taken  away  from
them  and  put  into  nontradables,  especially  real  estate. Tne  impact  of  excessive
nominal  domestic  demand  and  currency  overvaluation  on the  price  of real  estate
is  exemplified  in  Figure  7,  which  shows  how  the  real  rental  price  of  office  space
in  Malaysia  mirrored  the  evolution  of  Malaysia's  current  account  deficit.
FIGURE  7
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEFICITS  AND REAL  RENTAL  PRICE  OF OFFICE
BUILDINGS  IN  MALAYSIA
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Source:  Alan  Gelb,  "The  Speculative  Real  Assets  Cycle  in  Oil  Exporting  Countries",
1987,  unpublished  World  Bank  paper.
2.26  The  Wealth  Effect  of  Currency  Overvaluation:  Overvaluation  is  likely
to  have  caused  a  wealth  effect  and  a shift  in  the  country's  perceived  permanent
income  that  affected  the  consumption-saving  functions  of  people  holding  assets
denominated  in  local  currency  (real  estate  and  financial  assets).  As the  local
currency  was  gaining  ground  against  strong  currencies  (which  in  most  developing
countries  are  the  most  common  yardstick  to  measure  value),  those  people  felt  not
only  that they  were  getting  richer,  but also  that they  were  doing  so rapidly.
Their  felt  need  to save  was therefore  reduced,  and  their  propensity  to consume
grew.  Incentives  were such  that  the increased  consumption  went into  imported
goods  and  trips  abroad,  thus  creating  the  current  account  deficits  that  accompanied
overvaluation.17
2.27  Speculative  Capital  Flows: In  Latin  America,  where  capital  tends  to
flow more easily  across  boundaries  than in most other regions,  incentives
encouraged  borrowing  in  foreign  exchange  to  invest  in  assets  denominated  in  local
currency,  a practice  that  proved  to be extremely  risky.  The incentives  arose
because,  with ar.  appreciating  currency,  the  cost  of foreign  borrowing  was  not
only  low  but  declining,  while  the  price  of assets  denominated  in  local  currency
was increasing.
The  Distorted  Allocation  of Credit
2.28  As  a  result  of  these  incentives,  credit  flowed  toward  consumption  and
toward  investment  in activities  that  were profitable  only as a result  of the
artificial  set  of  relative  prices  created  by  the  increasing  overvalu-9tion  of  the
currency.  These  relative  prices  encouraged  real  estate  speculation  and  industrial
production  for  a domestic  market  that  was expanding  at an unsustainable  rate.
Thus,  macroeconomic  incentives  created  the environment  for  banks to lend to
activities  that were not viable  in the long run, setting  the stage  for the
financial  crisis  that followed. Figure  8 illustrates  how credit  became  con-
centrated  on nontradables  ir.  Colombia.
FIGURE  8
COLOMBIA.
RELATIVE PRICES AND PRODUCTION  NONTRADEABLES'  SHARE IN BANKS' CREDIT
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Source:  Revista  del  Banco  de la  Republica  de  Colombia,  various  issues.18
Inadequate  Institutional  Management  and  Control  of the  Financial  System
2.29  Prudential  control  of  the  banking  system,  that  is,  control  to  ensure
the  prudent  behavior  of  banks,  is  necessary  because  the  costs  of  risk-taking  in
banking  operations  eventually  burden  the taxpayer.  Banking  regulations  and
supervision  were particularly  inadequate  in the distressed  countries  when it
came  to control  imprudent  financial  practices  such  as credit  concentration  and
maturity,  interest  rates  and  currency  mismatches  between  assets  and  liabilities;
and to regulations  concerning  provisions  for  bad debts  and  write-offs,  which
were  either  too  permissive  or  not  properly  enforced. In addition,  supervisory
agencies  were  frequently  weak  and  ill  prepared  to  assess  properly  the  health  of
financial  institutions.
2.30  Although  in  some  cases  the  banks'  imprudent  financial  practices  were
the  consequence  of  negligent  management,  most  commonly  they  were  the  result  of
deliberate  decisions  taken  to  favor  borrowers  linked  by  ownership  with  financial
institutions.  Ownership  linkages  have  not  caused  damage  to  the  integrity  of  the
banking  system  in some  developed  countries,  notably  Germany  and  Japan,  mainly
because  banking  regulations  and supervision  ensure  an independent  management.
In  countries  where  the  independence  of  banking  decisions  is  not  ensured,  however,
these  linkages  encourage  the  concentration  of  bank  credit  on related  companies
and  weaken  the  criteria  used  to  approve  loans  to  these  companies,  thus  increasing
the risk of financial  institutions. This factor  proved  very important  in
precipitating  the  current  financial  crises  in  several  countries. For  example,
in  Chile,  Colombia,  Yugoslavia,  Mexico  and,  among  developed  countries,  in  Spain,
the  financial  crisis,  although  general,  particular'-  affected  the  portfolios  of
banks  belonging  to industrial/financial  conglomerae,-.  Also,  in several  coun-
tries,  losses  have  been  particularly  high in  government-owned  financial  insti-
tutions  lending  to  state-owned  enterprises.  In  these  cases,  as  in  those  involving
private  conglomerates,  credit  decisions  were  taken  at less  than  arms'  length.
C.  THE  UNRAVELING  OF CRISES
2.31  The  expansionary  phase  of  the  financial  cycle  had  itself  embodied  the
factors  that  would  eventually  bring  about  the  contractionary  phase. After  a  lag
of different  duration  in different  countries,  the  following  events  started  to
occur:  (a) the rising  costs  of nontradable  inputs  substantially  reduced  the
profitability  of  industrial  enterprises,  impairing  their  ability  to  service  their
debts  and  forcing  them  to  lay  off  employees;  (b)  the  boom  of  nontradables  ended
because  the  public's  acquisitive  power  declined  as  a result  of  the  recession  of
tradables'  producers;  (c) the larger  current  account  deficits  increased  the
expectations  of  a  major  devaluation,  leading  to  increases  in  real  interest  rates;19
(d)  higher  devaluation  expectations  combined  with low profitability  of local
firms  and  with the  end  of the  nontradables  boom  to cause  capital  flight,  which
tended  to  contract  the  money  supply  and  to  further  increase  interest  rates;  and
(e)  when the  contractionary  effect  of capital  flight  could  no longer  be coun-
terbalanced  with  foreign  borrowing,  the  central  bank's  net  international  reserves
started  to fall  very  rapidly,  reinforcing  devaluation  expectations  ani  feeding
back the  destabilizing  forces.
2.32  As a result  of these  events,  and of the  negative  turn in the  terms
of  trade  that  made  their  effects  worse,  governments  were  forced  to  resort  to  IMF
financing,  to devalue,  and to take  measures  to contract  the  rate of growth  of
nominal  domestic  demand. People  often  assume  that  these  actions  were the  ones
that triggered  the financial  crisis. They forget  that  countries  resorted  to
those  measures  because  they  were  already  in financial  crisis.
The  Falling  Profitability  of  Enterprises
2.33  The predominant  role of falling  profits in generating  financial
problems  is clearly  shown  in the  case  of Colombia,  where  the  portfolio  of the
banks deteriorated  significantly  in 1982-83  although,  at 34% of GDP, total
domestic  credit  to the  private  sector  was  not  high  by 'nternational  standards.
8  Furthermore,  the  ratio  of domestic  credit  to GDP  had increased  only three
percentage  points  in 1982-84,  when the  portfolio  problems  developed.
2.34  The  Colombian  debtors'  inability  to  service  an  almost  unchanged  level
of  debt  was  a  result  of  the  currency  overvaluation  maintained  during  the  preceding
years  (Figure  9,  left),  which  caused  a  profits  squeeze  in  the tradables  sector.
In those  years,  the cost of nontradable  inputs  (direct  and  indirect  labor)
increased  faster  than  the  prices  of final  products. This effect  was stronger
in tradable  production,  but  some  nontradable  sectors  (construction,  utilities)
also  suffered  from  it. As a  result  of this  squeeze,  the  ratio  of  gross  surplus
of enterprises  to labor  costs  (payroll)  declined  from  1.44  in 1975  to 1.12 in
1984  for  the  economy  as  a whole  (Figure  9, right). As their  profits  declined,
firms  found  it  more difficult  to finance  their  investments,  a good  portion  of
which  they  were  undertaking  in  order  to  reduce  their  growing  labor  costs. The
ratio  of  gross  investment  to  gross  surplus,  a  measure  of  the  burden  imposed by
investment  needs  upon the  firms'  gross  profits,  increased  from 31%  in 1975  to
40% in 1983.
8 Colombia  followed  more conservative  macroeconomic  policies  than the  rest  of
the countries  in the  sample. As a result,  credit  did  not increase  as  much as
in  those  other  countries  and  financial  distress  was  much  milder.20
FIGURE 9
RELATIVE  PRICES AND  PROFITABILITY  OF COLOMBIAN  FIRMS
1974-83
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Source:  Armual  Report  of the  Bogota  Stock  Exchange,  various  issues.
-'.35  The  profit  squeeze  that  resulted  from  the  currency  overvaluation  was
reflected  in the  accounts  of a sample  of 44 firms  listed  on the  Bogota  Stock
Exchange. The  ratio  of net-profits  to sales  of the  sample  declined  from  9.4%
in 1979 to 0.6% in 1982,  and it became  negative  in 1983.  As a result,  the
0  le's ratio  of internally  generated  cash (net  profits  plus  depreciation)  to
sales  declined  from 3.8%  to 1.7%  during  the  same  period  (Figure  10,  right).
The  liquidity  problems  caused  by  the  declining  profits led manufacturing  firms
to  increase  their  borrowings.  While  the  firms'I  increased  indebtedness  made  their
financial  situation  worse,  the  negative  effect  of  distorted  relative  prices  upon
their  profits  remained  a stronger  factor  than  the  volume  of debt  in  causing  the
sector's  financial  problems:  the  sample's  ratio  of  total  debt  to  sales  less  than
doubled  in 19796-84  (Figure  10, left),  while the ratio of the same debt to
internally  generated  cash  multiplied  11 times.  The ratio  of short-term  debt
(maturing  in  less than  one  year)  to  sales  increased  by  only  11%,  while  its  ratio
to internally  generated  cashi  rose  230%.
2.36  Similar  reducezons  in the profitoility of enterprises  have been
observed  in  other  countries  for  which  data  exist. In  Uruguay,  the  real  rate  of
return  of  a  sample  of  55  industrial  companies  declined  from  7.7%  in  1978  to  0.7%21
FIGURE 10
INTERNALLY  GENERATED  CASH  AND  DEBT  AS A PERCENT  OF SALES
IN  COLOMBIAN  FIRMS. 1974-83
IN'iRNALLY GENERATED  CASH (IGC)  DEBT  AS A % OF SALES
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Figure  11 shows  how capital  inflows  fell  short  of the  current  account  deficit
in Latin  America  in 1981,  declined  rapidly  after  that  and  became  outflows  in
1983.  The difference  between the two curves  was financed  with losses  in
international  reserves.
9  Jaime  de-  Melo,  Ricardo  Pascale  and  James  Tybout,  "Microeconomic  Adjustment  in
Uruguay  during  1973-81:  The interplay  of Real  and  Financial  Shocks";  and  Julio
Calvez  and  James  Tybout  "Microeconomic  Adjustments  in  Chile  during  1977-81:  The
Importance  of  Being  a Grupo'.  Both-  in  World  Development,  Volume  13  Number  8.22
FIGURE  11
CAPITAL  FLOWS  AND  tLRRENT  ACCOUNT
DEFICITS  IN  LATIN  AMERICA
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Note:  The  difference  between  the  curves  shows  the  excess  or deficit  of  capital
inflows  to cover  the  current  account  deficits  and, therefore,  it is a  measure
of capital  flows that were not caused  by, or reflected  in, current  account
deficits  in  the  year  when  they  took  place. In  1975-79,  capital  inflows  exceeded
the current  account  deficits,  leading  to a buildup  of reserves. In 1981-85,
reserves  fell  because  capital  inflows  were not enough,  to finance  the  current
account. Since  1983,  capital  flows  have  beert  negative.
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS)
2.38  The  fall  in  net international  reserves  tended  to  cause  a  contraction
in  the  stock  of  money. Initially,  some  countries  tried  to  shield  their  economies
from  this  contraction  by increasing  the  rate  of  monetary  creation  while  borrowing
abroad  to cover  the  decline  in reserves. However,  expanded  monetary  creation
further  increased  the  pressure  on  the  trade  account  and  encouraged  capital  flight,
worsening  the  problem  after  a short  while. Eventually,  international  lenders
became  concerned  and  stopped  lending  to  these  countries.  Without  external  credit,
reserves  fell  faster  and  liquidity  problems  escalated.23
2.39  The  liquidity  crisis  brought  about  sharp  rises  in  real  interest  rates,
which  also  tended  to increase  as  a  result  of devalurtion  expectations  10 and  the
simultaneous  increase  in international  interest  rates.  The effect  of rising
interest  rates  on  the  banks'  portfolios  was  threefold:  (a)  it  reduced  the  current
profits  of debtors;  (b)  it  reduced  the  present  value  of expected  profits,  thus
further  depressing  the  value of existing  capital  assets;  and (c) it exerted
pressures  on the liquidity  of enterprises.  Collection  problems  escalated,  as
the income  generated  by the assets  pledged  as collateral  fell  below the  cash
flow  needed  to service  their  associated  debts. Foreclosures  did  not solve  the
problem  because  the  price  of collateral  also  collapsed. The financial  crisis
had started.
2.40  Eventually,  the  fall  in international  reserves  forced  major  devalu-
ations. While  devaluations  corrected  the  distortion  in  relative  prices  that  led
to the  crisis,  setting  the stage  for  the  recovery  of the  tradable  sectors  and
the  resumption  of stable  economic  growth,  their  impact  on the  financial  system
was  so  devastating  that  most  of  the  indebted  economies  remained  severely  depressed.
Their  capacity  to  increase  exports  rapidly  was  severely  diminished  because:  (a)
exportine  companies  were  in  bad  shape  as  a  result  of  the  previous  overvaluation;
(b)  most of the investment  of the  overvaluation  period  had  been allocated  to
nontradable  activities;  (c)  the  burden  of the servicing  the external  debt in
local  currency  increased  substantially,  reducing  the  availability  of  savings  for
investment;  (d)  devaluations  coincided  with a worldwide  recession  and (e)  the
domestic  financial  distress  that accompanied  these  events  generated  economic
forces  that led to a perverse  allocation  of resources  and to macroeconomic
instability.
III.  THE  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  FINANCIAL  CRISES
A. THE  SYMPTOMS
Stagflation
3.1  In the  early  1980s,  overindebted  countries  were  forced  to implement
stabilization  programs  because  they  could  not  to  finance  the  large  current  account
deficits  from  the  previous  years. The  results  of these  programs  have  not  been
encouraging. While  the  current  account  deficits  have  been reduced,  inflation
has  accelerated  in  several  countries  and  the  rate  of growth  of real  production
has declined  substantially  or has become  negative. Some of these  countries,
10  This  effect  was  highly  visible  in  countries  with  liberal  interest  rate  policies.
In  countries  repressing  interest  rates,  it  was  less  visible  but still  present,
shown  in  higher  rates  in  unofficial  markets  and  large  capital  flight.24
like  Brazil  and  Argentina,  have  shown  an  erratic  economic  behavior,  with  periods
of  high  inflation  followed  first  by  price  stability  and  later  by  renewed  inflation.
Some  countries,  like  Yugoslavia,  are  confronting  a  steady  destabilization,  while
others  remain  immersed  in  a deep  stagflation.
3.2  The overindebted  countries'  limited  success  in achieving  stability
can  be attributed  to  the  policies  they  have  followed. For  these  countries,  the
objectives  of economic  stabilization  should  have  been to reduce  inflation  and
the  current  account  deficit  while  minimizing  the impact  of these  measures  on
growth.  To  do  this,  domestic  production  of  tradables  had  to  become  more  competitive
so that  the  decline  in  demand  did  not  translate  into  reduced  production.  Most
of the  countries  assumed  that  real devaluation  would  be sufficient  to attain
external  balance,  regardless  of  what  was  happening  to  nominal  domestic  demand,
and  that  it  would  be effective  regardless  of  what  was  happening  to  the  domestic
relative  prices  of tradables  and  nontradables.  Hence,  the  most  common  stabi-
lization  package  among financially  distressed  countries  included  substantial
real  devaluations  (Figure  1) but  no reduction  in  the  rate  of growth  of  nominal
domestic  demand  (Figure  13).25
FIGURE 12
REAL EXCHANGE RATE AGAINST THE US DOLLAR, 1980-85
SAMPLE OF 17 FINANCIALLY  DISTRESSED COUNTRIES.
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Note:  IAC-Latin  American  Countries,  NON-IAC-Other  Countrif-s.  The  sample  comprises
the 17 Baker countries.
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS),  various issues.
3.3  This combination of policies helped with the external deficit but
exacerbated the domestic rate of inflation.  Given the external constraint,
exCess nominal domestic demand caused an acceleration  of inflation,  and several
countries showed signs of a vicious circle of devaluation and inflation: the
more they devalued, the higher the inflation rate and the more they needed to
devalue.  On the supply  side, the shortage  of imported  materials and spare parts
depressed domestic production, leading to unemployment and economic hardship.
For many countries, the result has been the already mentioned alternation of
recession and expansion, depending on the availability of external financing;
for others, it has meant continuing stagflation.26
FIGURE  13
NOMINAL  DOMESTIC  DEMAND  GROWTH  IN  THE  1980S
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Note:  The  sample  comprises  the  17  Baker  countries.
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS),  various  issues.
Lack  of Supply  Response  to Devaluations
3.4  The idea that devaluation  alone  was sufficient  to attain  external
balance  is  based  on  the  belief  that  external  and  internal  imbalances  are  different
problems  and,  therefore,  need to be treated  with  different  instruments.  They
are, in fact,  different  manifestations  of the same  phenomenon:  an excess  of
acquisitive  power  over  domestic  supply  at the  current  price  level." Therefore,
the  appropriate  instrument  to attain  both internal  and  external  adjustment  is
a reduction  of the rate  of growth  of nominal  domestic  demand.  1
2 Devaluations
11 Nominal  domestic  demand  can  be too  great  to obtain  domestic  price  stability
or equilibrium  in  the  balance  of  payments  even  when  real  production  is falling
or stagnant. This is the  case  when domestic  expenditures  are  expanded  in the
presence  of a  binding  external  constraint.
12 The fact that  the sharp  devaluations  of the  past few  years  have coincided
with equally  sharp  reductions  of trade  deficits  in the  overindebted  countries
has reinforced  the idea that  devaluations  are sufficient  to attain  external
balance.  However,  this interpretation  ignores  the fact that,  in the  case of
these  countries,  trade  deficits  would  have  disappeared  even  if  they  had  overvalued
their  currencies,  simply  because  nobody  would  have financed  these  deficits.27
alone  do not  produce  lasting  changes  in  the  trade  balance  when  there  is excess
nominal  domestic  demand  because  their  effects  are  reversed  by  domestic  inflation.
A reduction  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  domestic  demand,  on  the  other  hand,
will  both improve  the  balance  of payments  and  stabilize  the  price  level  since
it  reduces  the  acquisitive  power  of the  population.
3.5  The  goal  of  devaluation  is  to  minimize  the  impact  of  reduced  domestic
demand on production  by inducing  an increase  in demand for exports  and a
substitution  of domestic  for imported  products. The attainment  of this  goal
requires  a shift  in the  allocation  of resources  from  nontradable  to tradable
activities  and  an opposite  shift  in the  composition  of domestic  demand. Real
devaluations  facilitate  this  shift  by causing  an increase  in  the  absolute  price
of  tradables.  If  there  is  no  devaluation,  the  required  change  in  relative  prices
can take place  only through  a fall in the  nominal  prices  of nontradables,  a
process  that  can take  a very long  time.  Meanwhile,  unemployment  is likely  to
rise  and economic  activity  remains  depressed. Thus,  devaluation  is  mainly  an
instrument  for  economic  recovery,  not  for  stabilization."3
3.6  For a real devaluation  to be successful,  the domestic  prices of
tradables  must increase  relative  to those  of nontradables.  But this  does  not
always  occur. Quite  commonly,  there  is an explicit  or implicit  indexation  of
wages,  which  defeats  the  government's  efforts  to shift  relative  prices  through
devaluations  because  the  real  wage,  the  basic  nontradable  price,  does  not  fall
as  much  as is  needed  to  make  production  of tradables  competitive.  As a result,
real  devaluations  reduce  the  purchasing  power  of the  local  currency  in  terms  of
foreign  exchange  but  do not  encourage  the  production  of tradables.
3.7  There  are  other  rigidities,  such  as  price  controls,  direct  allocation
of resources,  and equivalent  administrative  regulations,  that limit  resource
flows  to the  activities  that  could  bring aboLu  economic  recovery. Financial
crisis  introduces  rigidities  that  preclude  the  flow  of resources  not only  from
nontradables  to tradables  but, more generally,  from inefficient  to efficient
activities.  This perverse  allocation  is made possible  by the changes  that
financial  distress  introduces  in  the  normal  behavior  of economic  agents.
3.8  Faced  with immediate  bankruptcy,  both  bankers  and  their  debtors  give
priority  to their  survival  over  other,  longer-term  objectives,  including  prof-
itability. Debtors  borrow  at interest  rates  higher  than  the  long-term  profit-
ability  of their  real  assets,  even if they  have  no clear  idea  of how they  are
13 Devaluations  have a contractionary  effect that is additional  to that of
restrictive  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  because  they reduce  the  acquisitive
power  of  a given  nominal  income. This  effect,  however,  is  nullified  if  nominal
income  increases  proportionally.28
going  to repay  their  debts. Bankers  refinance  bad  debtors  because  failing  to
do so  would  force  them  to increase  their  write-offs.  Furthermore,  bankers  lend
almost  exclusively  to  bad  debtors  because,  to  remain  liquid,  they  raise  deposit
interest  rates  to levels  that the  more solvent  borrowers  are not willing  to
pay.  14
3.9  The  transfer  of  resources  to  loss-making  firms  has  devastating  effects
on  the  allocation  of  resources.  Loss-making  firms  are  maintained  in  operation,
wasting  resources  that  could  be employed  in  increasing  production  of  exportable
goods  or  saved  to  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  of  domestic  demand  and  macroeconomic
instability.  Furthermore,  firms  unable  to  sell  their  goods  produce  for  inventories
that  will  be hard to sell.
B. THE  ROOTS  OF  MACROECONOMIC  INSTABILITY
3.10  In addition  to blocking  the flow of resources  toward  competitive
activities,  financial  crisis  also contributes  to macroeconomic  instability.
Governments  are  quite  reluctant  to  allow  the  demise  of the  banking  system,  and
tend  to take  actions  to maintain  afloat  both the  banks  and their  inefficient
debtors.  These actions include raising  protection,  granting  preferential
allocation  of foreign  exchange  to distressed  borrowers,  and  maintaining  high
rates  of  monetary  creation  to  sustain  the  liquidity  of  banks.
3.11  Financial  crisis  leads  to macroeconomic  instability  by generating
forces  that:  (a)  lead to high rates  of monetary  expansion;  (b)  create  wealth
effects  that  tend  to  maintain  high  rates  of  expansion  of  nominal  domestic  demand;
(c) increase  the income  velocity  of financial  assets; and (d) reduce the
effectiveness  of  increased  interest  rates  in  depressing  credit  demand. Although
these  effects  may  take  place  in  countries  without  large  external  debts,  generally
there  is a direct  link  between  a country's  foreign  exchange  cash flow  and  the
inflationary  effects  of financial  distress.
The  External  Transfer  Problem
3.12  As  a  result  of  the  interruption  of  voluntary  lending  from  abroad  and
the  increased  service  of  their  external  debt,  most  overindebted  countries  are
experiencing  negative  net  foreign  exchange  cash  flows.' 5 To  avoid  inflation,
14  For  a vivid  description  of  the  kind  of  behavior  that  financial  distress  induces
in bankers see: Aristobulo  de Juan, "How Gcod Bankers  Become  Bad Bankers,"
inforual  INDFD  paper,  1986.
15  The  net  cash  flows  in  foreign  exchange,  or  net  transfers,  are  defined  as  net
capital  flows  less interest  payments  abroad. They  become  negative  when dis-
bursements  from  abroad  no longer  cover  the  service  of the  external  debt.29
such  net  outflows  should  result  in  equivalent  net  reductions  in  the  reserve  money
in  circulation,  which  would take  place  as economic  agents  sell  local  currency
to  the  central  bank  in  exchange  for  foreign  exchange.  The  contraction  in  reserve
money  supply  is  needed  to  maintain  price  stability  because,  as a result  of the
net transfer  abroad,  an equivalent  contraction  takes  place in the domestic
availability  of real  goods  and  services.  This  was  what  happened  when  countries
were under  the gold standard. Foreign  exchange  outflows  caused  a decline  in
reserves,  which  led  to  a contraction  in  the  stock  of reserve  money.
3.13  Therefore,  in countries  with large negative  net transfers,  even
monetary  creation  aimed  at just  keeping  constant  the  stock  of reserve  money  in
nominal  terms  results  in  high rates  of inflation.  The figures  in  Table  1 show
the  changes  in  the  stock  of  reserve  money  that  would  have  occurred  had  Yugoslavia
been  on  a  gold  standard. The  decline  in  the  stock  of reserve  money  did  not  take
place,  however,  because the central  bank created  new reserve  money through
expanding  its  net domestic  assets,  which  brought  about  accelerated  inflation.
For  example,  in  1984,  to  keep the  stock  of reserve  money  constant,  the  central
bank  of  Yugoslavia  had  to  create  reserve  money  equivalent  to  64%  of  the  previous
year's  stock. This  would  have  been  highly  inflationary.  In  practice,  it  created
70%.
3.14  The  transfer  problem  is  intimately  linked  with  the  domestic  financial
problems.  Central  banks  intervene  to  create  reserve  money  because  the  contraction
that  would  take  place  as a result  of the  foreign  exchange  cash  outflows  would
induce  the  bankruptcy  of  banks.30
TABLE 1
MONETARY  PRESSURE CAUSED BY THE  NET
TRANSFERS PROBLEM IN  YUGOSLAVIA
(% OF  PREVIOUS YEAR'S  DINAR RESERVE MONEY)
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
NET TRANSFERS ABROAD  11.8  -2.7  -20.0  -12.5  -51.1
CHANGES IN F/C DEPOSITS  17.6  19.0  -0.2  5.5  -13.3
TOTAL F/C CASH FLOW  29.4  16.3  -20.2  -7.1  -64.4
MEMO:
ACTUAL  RATE  OF  DINAR  RESERVE  MONEY  NA  31.8  50.5  55.1  70.4
CREATION (FLOW)
INFLATION RATE (CPI)  L  29.9  39.7  32.9  39.1  55.4
Note: The foreign  currency  cash  flows  were converted into  dinars  at the  average
exchange rate and divided  by the  previous year's stock  of reserve  money.  The
result is the change in the stock of reserve money that would have happened
in the  absence of central  bank intervention.  In  1980-82, the foreign  exchange
cash flow was positive and led to increases in reserve money; the opposite
happened afterward.
In  Yugoslavia, flows  of foreign  exchange include  both transactions  with agents
abroad and changes in foreign currency deposits.  These estimates are only
suggestive of the order of magnitude of flows because of lack of data on the
actual flows by currency.  For example, an unknown portion of the decline in
the US Dollar value of deposits in 1984  was caused  by the appreciation  of the
US Dollar relative to the DM (a substantial portion of the foreign currency
deposits are denominated in  DMs).  Yugoslav authorities  have confirmed that a
decline in deposits took place in that year.
SOURCE: World Debt Tables for net transfers, National Bank of Yugoslavia for
foreign gurrency deposits and IMF for reserve money
Monetary Expansion
3.15  Governments trying to keep loss-making  banks afloat confront a dif-
ficult dilemma.  On the one hand, they want to stabilize the economy, which
requires a reduction in the fiscal deficit.  On the other hand, they need to
make substantial transfers to maintain the liquidity of the banking  system.31
Several  countries  have tried to resolve  this dilemma  by granting  the needed
transfers  not  through  the  budget  but through  the  central  bank,  which  transfers
resources  by incurring  losses  in its  operations  with the  banking  system. One
of the  most  common  mechanisms  through  which  these  transfers  are  granted  is  the
absorption  by the  central  bank  of  the  foreign  exchange  valuation  losses  incurred
by financial  institutlons  (or  their  customers)  through  preferential  exchange
rates.
1 6 Also, central  banks frequently  absorb  the banks'  portfolio  losses
through  subsidized  rediscounts  and,  in some  cases,  through  the  purchase  of the
bad  portfolio  without  discount.
3.16  By  transferring  the  burden  of  these  losses  to  central  banks,  however,
governments  do not e]iminate  the  economic  consequences  of overspending. The
transfers  only  render  inadequate  the  conventional  definition  of fiscal  deficit.
If this definition  -s expanded  to include  the financial  public sector,  the
meaninglessness  of tae  transfer  of losses  is  exposed. This is obvious  in the
case  of  governments  transferring  to  central  banks  the  foreign  exchange  valuation
losses  of public  enterprises,  which  should  be covered  from  the  budget. It is
equally  true  when  the  government  decides  to  subsidize  other  borrowers  or  financial
intermediaries.
3.17  The  magnitude  of  losses  that  central  bank's  can  sustain  is  illustrated
in  Figure  14. In  YugoElavia,  inflation  has  been  increasing  throughout  the  1980s,
and  is  now 170%,  althcugh  the  conventionally  defined  fiscal  deficit  was  reduced
to  zero in  1981. However,  the  central  bank's  annual  losses  were  well  over  13%
of  GDP in  1984. In  Costa  Rica,  where  the  conventionally  defined  fiscal  deficit
is  about  1.3%,  the  central  bank  annual  losses  are  on  the  order  of  7%  of  GDP,  and
the  ratio  of the  stock  of losses  to  GDP  exceeds  50%. As a result,  the  current
account  deficit  is about  9% of  GNP.
3.18  The expansicnary  effects  of the  central  bank's  losses  on the  money
supply  are  not  obvious  iiecause  they  occur  by omission. In  the  case  of foreign
exchange  valuation  losses,  the  monetary  contraction  that  should  take  place  when
debtors  purchase  foreign  currency  to  service  their  debts  does  not  happen  in  full
because  debtors  pay  to  the  central  bank  an  amount  in  local  currency  that  is  less
than  what  would  be  required  at  the  current  exchange  rate. The  same  is  true  with
the  portfolio  losses  of banks:  the  monetary  contraction  that  should  take  place
when  the  holders  of the  banks'  liabilities  absorb  these  losses  does  not  happen
because  the  central  bank is  subsidizing  the  banks.
16  Quite  commonly,  the  central  bank  also  absorbs  the  valuation  losses  incurred
by the  government  on its  external  debt.32
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Note: The f  iscal  deficit only  covers the  central government. The central  bank's
losses  are  approximated  by its "other  net  domestic  assets,"1  which  comprise  mostly
those losses.
source: International Financial Statistics (IFS),  various issues.
3.19  The  monetary effects  of  the  central  bank's  losses  are further  obscured
by the fact that not all of them result in an immediate cash creation.  When
exchange rates are subsidized, lossf-s  are accrued to the ce-nt-ral  bank whenever
the  currency is  devalued. Although  portfolio  losses  are  not e.-crued  in  the  books
of the central bank, they are accrued in the accounts of tha other banks, which
will in  due time  be rescued  by the  central  bank.  Cash losses, in  contrast,  occur
only  when the central  bank  makes  payments abroad  on  behalf of  domestic  borrowers,
or when it transfers subsidies to weak banks.  Only the cash losses have an
immediate monetary effect.  Nevertheless, accrued but unrealized losses also
have a direct expansionary effect on nominal domestic demand.
The Wealth Effect of Unrealized Losses
3.20  The operation of banks that are insolvent generates a wealth effect
that  keeps nominal domestic  demand  at levels  higher than  those  that  would prevail
if the losses were absorbed by the holders of the banks' liabilities.  As long33
as liabilities  exceed  assets  in  the  banking  system,  depositors  count  as  part  of
their  wealth  some  financial  assets  that  in  effect  do  not  exist.  Therefore,  their
propensity  to spend  is  not diminished,  as it would  be if they  had to rebuild
their  lost  financial  assets. 17 The sign  of the  wealth  effect  is  unambiguously
similar  to that of a monetary  expansion.  In the absence  of central  bank
intervention,  those  losses  would  be immediately  realized  through  the  bankruptcy
of distressed  banks,  which  would  contract  the  stock  of monetary  and financial
assets.  A similar  wealth  effect  takes  place  when  central  banks  absorb  devaluation
losses  that  are accrued  but not realized  in  cash.  In the  absence  of central
bank  intervention,  debtors  in  foreign  exchange  would  contract  their  expenditures
when  realizing  that  their  indebtedness  has  increased,  even  if  tht1r  payments  are
not  still  due,  because  they  would  know  that  they  had  to  generate  more  cash  service
their  debts.
3.21  The wealth  effect  plays  a role similar  to those  of wage indexation
and  inflationary  expectations:  it  increases  the  resistance  of  the  economy  to  the
changes  needed  for  both  stabilization  and  improved  allocation  of  resources. In
the  case  of  losses  officially  accrued  to  the  central  bank,  the  monetary  authorities
have  no ocher  choice  but to eventually  incur  the cash  losses. In all cases,
monetary  creation  undertaken  to cover  losses  that  had already  been implicitly
or explicitly  accrued  validates  a behavior  that  was elicited  by the lack of
adjustment  at the  time  of the  accrual.
The  Effects  on Spreads  and  Velocity
3.22  In  several  countries,  central  banks  are  financing  part  or  all  of  their
transfer  of  resources  to  financially  distressed  economic  agents  by  manipulating
interest  rates  and  spreads  between  lending  and  deposit  rates.  A  common  mechanism
is  the  imposition  of  negative  real  deposit  interest  rates. The  proceeds  of the
tax  thus  collected  are  used  to  help  in  the  repayment  of  external  obligations  of
illiquid  or insolvent  debtors,  to  keep  insolvent  companies  in  operation  and,  in
multiple-currency  countries,  to  maintain  the  value  of  foreign  currency  deposits.
17 A recognized  financial  loss  has two effects  on economic  behavior:  (a)  an
income  effect,  which  leads  agents  to save  in  order  to  rebuild  the  desired  total
value  of their  portfolios;  and  (b)  a substitution  effect,  that  concentrates  the
marginal  saving  on  financial  instruments,  the  share  of  which  in  the  total  portfolio
has  been  reduced  from  the  originally  desired  level. The  substitution  effect  can
work in reverse,  however,  when the  financial  loss  is  accompanied  by a loss  of
confidence  in  the  banking  system,  which  is  what  governments  try  to avoid.34
3.23  Central  banks  can  increase  the  spread  directly,  by  controlling  interest
rates,  or indirectly,  by forcing  banks  to surrender  resources  to the  central
bank at zero  or 1.ow  nominal  interest  rates. In the  first  case,  the  income  of
banks  is  boosted  artificially  by fixing  a large  difference  between  deposit  and
lending  interest  rates,  thus  helping  them  to  recover  their  losses. For  example,
in  Yugoslavia  the  spread  between  the  controlled  deposit  and  lending  rates  increased
from 5% in 1981  to 27%  in 1984;  banks  kept  the  proceeds. In the  second  case,
governments  force  banks to invest  a portion  of their  assets  in low-yielding
financial  instruments,  the  proceeds  of which  are used to subsidize  the  banks
themselves  (through  nonperforming  portfolio  purchases,  for example)  or their
debtors  (through  subsidized  refinancing).  Although  the  tax  is  levied  on  banks,
the  payers  are  depositors  and  the  beneficiaries  are  the  banks,  which  pass  on to
the  government  resources  of others  and  receive  them  back  as increases  in their
net  worth.  Even in countries  O'here  there  is  no control  on interest  rates  nor
increases  in reserve  requirements  or forced  investments,  banks tend to exert
their  market  power  to increase  the  spreads  and  improve  their  profitability.
3.24  Countries  controlling  interest  rates  to alleviate  financial  crises
(Argentina,  Bolivia,  Yugoslavia,  Mexico)  have  experienced  a  declining  demand  for
monetary  and  financial  assets  and  capital  flight. Reductions  in  the  demand  for
money  compound  the  problems  created  by excessive  monetary  creation  because  they
increase  the  population's  propensity  to spend  out  of a given  stock  of money.
When  the  velocity  of  money  is  increasing,  nominal  domestic  demand  will  rise  even
if the  stock  of  money  Is  not  increased. In  Argentina  and  Bolivia,  the  decline
in  demand  for  monetary  and  financial  assets  has  been  crucial  in  causing  the  rate
of growth  of  nominal  expenditures  to  accelerate.  Although  this  phenomenon  has
not  been  widespread,  the  role  of rising  velocity  will  become  more important  in
other  distressed  countries  if real  interest  rates  are  not raised. This would
make it  more difficult  for  the  government  to control  inflation  through  credit
restraint.
Interest  Rates  and  Credit  Demand
3.25  Financial  crisis  also reduces  the effectiveness  of interest  rate
policies  in reducing  credit  demand  and, through  it, the rate of growth  of
expenditures.  Borrowers  in  distress  do  not  care  about  the  rate  of interest  they
have to pay.  As a result,  the  usual  relationship  between  interest  rates  and
credit  demand  is  reversed:  higher  interest  rates  lead  to  greater  credit  demand
because  they increase  the amounts  that  distressed  debtors  have to borrow  to
service  their  previously  contracted  debts.
;  t~~~~~~~~~~~~~35
A Special  Case:  Multiple-Currency  Countries
3.26  In  some  countries,  the  banking  system  is  allowed  to receive  deposits
and  lend  in  foreign  currency.  In  such  countries,  devaluations  cause  an  immediate
increase  in  the  local  currency  value  of  accounts  denominated  in  foreign  exchange,
increasing  the  purchasing  power  in  local  currency  terms  of  the  holders  of  foreign
exchange  deposits. In normal  circumstances,  this  effect  would  be compensated
by a commensurate  decline  in the propensity  to spend  of debtors  in foreign
exchange. However,  if the  borrowers'  ability  to spend  is not reduced  either
because  they  are  not  repaying  their  obligations  or  because  the  central  bank is
assuming  the  foreign  exchange  risk  in  their  debts,  the  effect  of  the  devaluation
is  not  symmetrical.  In these  cases,  the  effect  -f devaluation  in  reducing  the
population's  propensity  to spend  is  less  than  expected.
3.27  Monetary  creation  attributable  to the  effects  of devaluation  on the
local  acquisitive  power  of  deposits  denominated  in  foreign  currency  can  be  very
important  in  some  countries.  In  Yugoslavia,  for  example,  commercial  banks  onlend
about  20%  of these  deposits  and deposit  the  remainder  with the  central  bank,
which  suffers  losses  in local  currency  terms  with  devaluations  because  it does
not  keep  assets  denominated  in foreign  currency  to  match  its  liabilities  with
the  banks. Thus,  when the  currency  is  devalued,  only  about  20%  of the  increase
in  the  dinar  value  of  the  banking  system's  local  liabilities  in  foreign  exchange
is  matched  with  equivalent  increases  in the  diner  value  of credits  denominated
in  foreign  exchange. The  remaining  80%  is  matched  by the  central  bank's  capital
losses  in  dinar  terms.  As  a  result,  almost  three  quarters  of  the  1981-84  increase
in  reserve  money  was  attributable  to  increases  in  the  dinar  value  of the  central
bank's  foreign  currency  liabilities  to the  local  commercial  banks.
C. THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF IGNORING  THE  LOSSES
3.28  Absorbing  losses  is  such  a  painful  process  that  the  natural  tendency
of governments  confronting  a serious  financial  crisis  is,  first,  to  do  nothing,
hoping  that  the  problem  will  disappear  with  time,  and  second,  to  find  a  solution
that  leads  to economic  recovery  without  having  to absorb  the losses. None of
these  actions  are likely  to solve  the problem,  as the  experience  of several
countries  that  have tried  them  shows.
Deepening  of Financial  Distress
3.29  Doing  nothing  does  not  solve  the  problems  of  financial  crisis.  Rather,
the  symptoms  described  in the  preceding  section  tend to aggravate  with time.
The  longer  the  delay  in  allocating  ,e  losses  and  recapitalizing  the  banks,  the
larger  the  losses  will  be  because  financial  distress  is  a  progressive  phenomenon.36
When  banks  have losses,  a double  effect  is  produced:  their  net  worth  is  reduced
and  their  ability  to  regenerate  their  original  net  worth  through  profits  diminishes
because  there  are  less  performing  assets  to  cover  the  expenditures  of  an  unchanged
or increasing  amount  of liabilities.  Figure  15  shows  the  deterioration  of the
profitability  of a  hypothetical  bank  with  an original  leverage  of 20 to 1 and
with  losses  ranging  up to  5%  of its  assets  (100%  of its  original  capital). The
figure  also  shows  the  period  needed  to recapitalize  it out  of normal  profits,
which  reaches  100  years  after  the  original  capital  is  lost. When  losses  amount
to 6% of the  assets  (120%  of the  original  capital),  the  bank  makes  losses  and
it  cannot  recover  without  an influx  of fresh  capital.
FIGURE  15
EFFECT  OF LOSSES  ON THE  PROFITABILITY  OF A
HYPOTHETICAL  BANK








Note: The bank of the example has a 20 to I  leverage, its interest  rates are 5%
and  8% for  deposits  and  loans  respectively,  its  administrative  costs  amount  to
3%  of the  original  assets,  and  it  has an  original  yield  on capital  of 9%.  The
results  of these  calculations  are  highly  sensitive  to  variations  in the  spread
and  operation  costs  but  are  always  progressive.
Inflation
3.30  Some  governments  have tried  to eliminate  financial  .- :rises  either  by
causing  a once-and-for-all  increase  in the  price  level  or  by setting  ceilings37
on  interest  rates  while  inflating  the  economy.  In  theory,  since  the  instantaneous
adjustment  in the price level  would take the economy  by surprise,  imposing
ceilings  on interest  rates  should  not  be necessary. After  the  adjustment  has
taken  place,  interest  rates  can  be  freely  set  by  market  forces  because  the  losses
have already  been  absorbed  by the  holders  of nonindexed  financial  assets. In
practice,  however,  a sudden  increase  in the price  level  will tend to create
inflationary  pressures  so strong  that governments  may force  central  banks to
validate  them. This  option  can  therefore  be treated  as functionally  equivalent
to increasing  the  rate  of inflation.
3.31  Inflation  is sometimes  advocated  as a solution  to financial  crisis
for  two  ma_n reasons:  (a)  no write-offs  are  needed  to eliminate  the stock  of
losses  of the  banking  system  because  price  increases  reduce  the  real  value  of
financial  assets  and  of liabilities  simultaneously;  and (b)  most  of the  burden
of the adjustment  falls  upon depositors,  which superficially  seems  equitable
because  they  are  part  of the  sector  that  profited  from  the  high real  rates  of
interest  that  normally  precede  and  accompany  a financial  crisis. These  schemes
are  not equitable,  however,  because  the  current  distribution  of deposits  does
not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  past  distribution  and,  more  important,  because
such  schemes  bail  out the  banks'  shareholders,  who  benefited  the  most from  the
operation  of the  banks.  Also,  an inflation  tax  distributes  the  burden  of the
subsidy  in an  uneven  and  unpredictable  manner  and  requires  the  closing  of the
financial  market  for  a prolonged  period  to  avoid  capital  flight.
3.32  More fundamentally,  xnflationary  schemes are not  a solution  to
financial  crisis  because  they do not address  the primary  cause  of financial
distress:  the  continued  allocation  of resources  to loss-making  activities.  On
the  contrary,  inflation  shifts  relative  prices  in  erratic  ways  that  set  the  stage
for  another  financial  crisis  in  the  near  future.  Furthermore,  since  the  elimination
of the  banking  system's  stock  of  losses  is  achieved  by deflating  the  real  value
of the  system's  existing  assets  and  liabilities,  it  results  in  new  losses;  the
income  generated  by the  smaller  scale  of operation  is  not enough  to cover  the
fixed  costs.  Increasing  the  size  of the  banking  system  in real  terms  becomes
difficult  because  of  the  high  inflation  rates. Such  a  step  would  not  make  sense,
anyway,  it  credit  expansion  would  go  to inefficient  activities.
3.33  The only country that has tried the inflationary  solution  in an
explicit  way, Argentina  in the early  1980s,  continued  to suffer  a financial
crisis  after  the  real  value  of the  then  existing  stock  of debts  was  wiped  out
by a sudden  acceleration  of inflation. Since  the  early  1980s,  179 financial
institutions  have failed  while  19  have  come  under  the  management  of  the  central
bank.  The  remaining  institutions  are  experiencing  serious  profitability  problems.38
The  country  was demonetized,  real interest  rates  rose  over  50%  in real  terms,
and the  average  maturity  of deposits  dropped  to less than  seven  days.  After
applying  this solution,  Argentina  was left  with at least  the same degree  of
financial  distress  as before,  plus  all  the  problems  of an extremely  high rate
of inflation.  The  government  then  tried  another  solution,  monetary  reform.
Monetary  Reform
3.34  Several  governments  have tried  to curb inflation  by reducing  the
deficit  of the  nonfinancial  public  sector  by transferring  expenditures  from  the
budget  to  the  central  bank. However,  inflation  has  remained  high  even  when  the
deficit  of the nonfinancial  public sector  fell.  Failing  to recognize  the
inflationary  effects  of central  bank losses,  some governments  have identified
inflationary  expectations  as  the  main  source  of  price  increases.  Following  this
idea,  Brazil,  Argentina  and  Bolivia  have  attempted  to  eliminate  their  macroeconomic
imbalances  through  stabilization  packages  based  on introducing  a new  currency
to  break  inflationary  expectations.
3.35  Inflationary  expectations,  however,  do  not  cause  inflation.  Inflation
is  essentially  a  monetary  phenomenon,  the  change  in the  price  of  money  relative
to the  price  of other  commodities.  As with any  other  commodity,  the  price  of
money  depends  on  supply  and  demand. Inflationary  expectations  are  important  but
for a different  reason:  they increase  the cost of stabilization  in terms  of
unemployment  and  lost  production.  If  companies  keep  on  raising  their  prices  and
workers  keep  on enjoying  wage increases  when the  rate  of growth  of  the  supply
of money is restricted  to levels  that do not validate  the current  rate of
inflation,  production  and employment  will drop because  of lack of effective
demand. Thus,  the  effects  of  inflationary  expectations  are  equivalent  to those
previously  described  for  wage indexation:  they are an obstacle  to shifts  in
relative  prices.
3.36  Monetary  reforms  are  also carried  out  to reverse  a declining  trend
in  demand  for  money,  which,  in  certain  countries,  may  be an important  source  of
inflation  (para.  3.22). Declines  in  demand  for  money,  however,  are  the  result
of  declining  yields  of  monetary  assets,  which,  in  turn,  arise  from  interest  rate
controls  or, in countries  bordering  on  hyperinflation,  from  a general  loss  of
confidence  in  the  local  currency. The  actions  needed  to  solve  this  problem  are
to  reduce  the  inflation  rate--to  foster  demard  for  non-interest-bearing  money--and
to liberalize  the interest  rate.  Although  these  two  effects  can  be achieved
without  monetary  reform,  the  introduction  of  a  new  currency  can  shorten  the  time
it  takes  for  the  public  to  believe  that  the  yield  of  monetary  assets  will  increase.39
3.37  Therefore,  although  inflationary  expectations  do  not  cause  inflation,
monetary  reform  can  be a powerful  instrument  to  accelerate  stabilization. It
is,  however,  an instrument  that  can  be  used  but  once  in  a  generation  because  its
impact  is  only  psychological.  If  it  is  not  accompanied  by measures  that  reduce
inflationary  pressures,  it soon loses  its effectiveness. In fact,  monetary
reform  is  only  useful  when  the  psychological  aspect  is  the  only  unresolved  issue
in  an otherwise  complete  stabilization  package.
3.38  The  package  introduced  in  Brazil,  the  Plan  Cruzado,  did  not  meet  these
requirements.  Instead  of  moving  to  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  domestic
demand,  the  government  resorted  to a  highly  expansionary  macroeconomic  policy,
repressing  its inflationary  impact  with price controls  and a fixed nominal
exchange  rate.  With nominal  domestic  demand  growing  very rapidly,  production
turned  away from  export  markets  to meet the local  boom,  diminishing  domestic
inflationary  pressures  but also dramatically  reducing  the large  trade  surplus
that  Brazil  had  enjoyed  since  the  early  1980s. The  removal  of  wage  indexation,
a part of the  package,  backfired  because  wages  increased  at rates  higher  than
inflation. The pressure  of domestic  demand  eventually  led  to a serious  over-
valuation  of the  currency.  manifested  through  purchasing  power  parity  changes
and,  where  price  controls  were in  force,  through  widespread  scarcities.  As the
currency  became  more overvalued,  real interest  rates  rose to extremely  high
levels. After  about  one  year,  the  government  was  forced  to  devalue  the  currency
and inflation  returned  with  a  vengeance.
3.39  In  Argentina,  the  government  introduced  the  Austral  Plan,  with  features
similar  to those of the Cruzado  Plan.  The nonfinancial  fiscal  deficit  was
relatively  low,  about  1.6%  of  GDP,  but  the  central  bank  was  posting  annual  losses
at the  rate of 2.5%  of GDP  as a result  of the  difference  between  the  interest
rates  it  paid  on forced  investments  and  the  rates  it  charged  on its  rediscounts,
most of which  were given  to  weak  banks.  Furthermore,  since  the  recipients  of
these  rediscounts  were  not  servicing,  and  are  not  likely  ever  to  service,  their
debts  with  the  central  bank,  the  whole  of  the  rediscounts  (principal  plus  interest)
was equivalent  to a fiscal  transfer.  18  If this  effect  is taken  into  account,
18  Banks  owned  by provincial  governments  and  banks  in  liquidation  are  among  the
heaviest  recipients  of rediscounts. Before  April  1986,  provincial  banks  were
financing  their  losses  with  deposit  increases,  which  they  got  by  paying  interest
rates  above  the  average.  In April  1986,  believing  that these  banks  were the
cause  of the  high  real  interest  rates  prevailing  in  the  country,  the  government
banned  them  from  the  free-interest-rate  deposit  market.  The  banks  became  illiquid
and,  at the  end  of  1986,  the  central  bank  waived  their  obligation  to  constitute
reserve  requirements.  Their  illiquidity,  however,  kept  on increasing,  and  the
central  bank  has  been  providing  them  with  resources  through  increasing  rediscounts.40
the overall  fiscal  deficit  easily  reached  7% of GDP.  With such a deficit,
inflationary  pressures  became  quite  strong,  real  interest  rates  rose  to levels
on the  order  of 50%,  the average  maturity  of deposits  became  slightly  longer
than  a  week  and  the  black  market  exchange  rate  increased  substantially  over  the
official  one. Time  rapidly  eroded  the  psychological  impact  of  monetary  reform
and reality  took over.  The government  introduced  several  mini-Austral  Plans
within  the  Austral  Plan,  and,  when  these  also  collapsed  amidst  inflation  rates
increasing  to 30%  per  month,  the  recent  Primavera  Plan.  Since  the  Primavera
Plan  does  not  address  the  fundamental  problem,  that  of  excessive  rates  of  growth
of nominal  domestic  eemand,  the possibilities  of success  for such Plan are
practically  nill. At the  core  of the  problem  is the  monetary  creation  carried
out  to  keep loss-making  banks  and  enterprises  in operation.
3.40  In Bolivia,  where  hyperinflation  raged in 1984-85,  the government
undertook  a  profound  cut  in the  fiscal.  deficit  as part  of the  plan  of financial
reform.  Inflation  declined  dramatically  in  the  ensuing  months  and  a  remonetization
of the economy  took  place.  The international  reserves  of the  banking  system
increased  enough  so  that  the  government  is  ready  to  resume  servicing  the  country's
external  debt.  However,  the  rapid  remonetization  and  the  accumulation  of  reserves
are mostly results  of the permission  granted to banks to receive deposits
denominated  in  foreign  exchange,  which  now  account  for  about  47%  of the  banking
system's  total  deposits. The  foreign  exchange  deposits  have  lifted  the  foreign
exchange  constraint  temporarily,  providing  a  respite  to  the  government,  but  they
are debts denominated  in foreign  exchange  and therefore  will bring serious
problems  unless  sources  of foreign  exchange  income  are  developed  fast.  Fur-
thermore,  the  government  still  has  to  solve  the  grave  problem  of  foreign  exchange
valuation  losses  suffered  by commercial  banks  when  the  government  converted  the
foreign  exchange  debts  of  nonfinancial  firms  to  local  currency  but  did  not  assume
the resulting  losses,  burdening  the  banks.  These  losses  are  now in the  books
of  banks,  which  cannot  absorb  them. The  government  cannot  absorb  them  either,
unless  it runs  fiscal  surpluses.
3.41  In  summary,  a  delay  in  dealing  with  financial  crisis  tends  to  frustrate
stabilization  efforts  while  creating  incentives  for  wasting  resources  much  needed
for economic  recovery.  Efforts  to attain  stable  growth  without  solving  the
underlying financial problems have  produced extremely negative results.
Therefore,  it  seems  correct  to  infer  that  stabilization  and  growth  can  be  achieved
only through  the simultaneous  application  of measures  aimed at solving  the
financial  problem  and  stabilizing  the  economy.41
IV.  SOLVING  FINANCIAL  CRISES
4.1  The most urgent  question  that governments  face  when confronting  a
financial  crisis  is  whether  or  not  to  prevent  banking  runs. As stated  earlier,
mechanisms  to  prevent  the  bankruptcy  of  the  banking  system  are  a  mixed  blessing
because,  while avoiding  banking runs, they also prevent  market forces  from
providing  a  solution  to  the  financial  problems  through  the  immediate  elimination
of inefficient  activities  and  their  obligations.  If  depositors  are  safe  but it
is  not  clear  who  will  bear  the  losses,  the  events  described  in  Chapter  III  unfold,
further  destabilizing  the  economy  and delaying  economic  recovery. Because  of
this,  when  the  first  step  of  protecting  depositors  is  taken,  the  second  step  of
allocating  the  part of the  losses  that  would  have  accrued  to them  also  has to
be taken. The  second  step  implies  transferring  government  resources  to  banks,
to their  borrowers,  or to  both.
4.2  This  chapter  focuses  on  the  decisions  that  governments  must  make  when
confronting  a financial  crisis.  Sections  A makes the case for government
intervention  to prevent  the bankruptcy  of the banking  system  and Section  B
examines  one of the most common instruments  used for this purpose--Deposit
Insurance  Corporations.  Section  C discusses  the  allocation  of the losses ind
the  rest  of the  chapter  reviews  the  macroeconomic  implications  of absorbing  the
losses  of depositors  through  transferring  resources  to the  banking  system  and
the  general  ways  in  which  these  transfers  can  be  carried  out. Chapter  IV  discusses
a strategy  to  carry  out  these  transfers  efficiently.
A. THE  CASE  FOR  GOVERNMENT  INTERVENTION
The  Risk  of Bank  Runs
4.3  Banking  has  strong  externalities  because  banks'  liabilities  constitute
means  of  payment.  If  the  public  loses  confidence  in  the  value  of  those  liabilities,
the costs  of transactions  in the  economy  increase  substantially,  reducing  or
eliminating  the  benefits  of  monetization  and  causing  losses  that  exceed  the  costs
of government  action. While  the  risk  of demonetization  is  low  when  weak  banks
manage  a  small  percentage  of  the  banking  system's  total  liabilities,  it  becomes
high  when  big  banks fail  and  even  higher  when  most  of the  banking  system  goes
bankrupt.1 9 A collapse  of the  banking  system  most likely  would  also  cause  the
demise  of perfectly  sound  firms  and  banks.
19  Inflation  taxes  also  cause  demonetization;  indeed,  that  is  one  of  the  factors
that  makes  them  so  undesirable.  However,  the  failure  of a  banking  system  seems
to  make a  more  drastic  and  lasting  impression  on  economic  agents  than  does  the
loss  of deposits  and  currency  through  inflation  taxes.42
The Scarcity of Entepreneurs and Managers
4.4  The auccess  of  bankruptcies in  redirecting  the  allocation  of  resources
depends to  a large  extent on the  ability of the  private sector to absorb and  put
to good use the good assets of bad debtors.  This ability is quite limited in
developing  countries  because entepreneutrial  and  managerial talents  are  typically
scarce.  In such circumstances, the government cannot be sure that liquidating
assets will not reduce the country's productive capacity.  Furthermore, with
only  a few  potential  buyers, the  transfer  of  a substantial  portion  of a country's
assets at very low prices could lead to an undesirable concentration of the
ownership of the country's productive capacity which, in turn, could lead to
future financial crises.
4.5  Management  and  entepreneurial problems  are  more  serious  in  the
industrial sector.  In agriculture it is relatively easy to sell foreclosed
assets to other entepreneurs who will exploit the transferred properties with
reasonable  efficiency.  But the  ability  needed  to  run an industrial  firm  requires
specialized knowledge, which, in some countries, is confined to a handful of
managers and entepreneurs.
4.6  It  has  been  argued that  removing  managers  and  entepreneurs  from  across
the industrial sector is justified  because they  have proved to  be incompetent.
Replacing them even with equally incompetent people would be helpful because
that would enforce financial discipline.  This argument ignores the major role
played in the financial crises of developing countries by misleading economic
incentives. It also ignores the  fact that  many distressed  firms once functioned
quite efficiently,  when economic incentives  were right.
B.  PRECLUDING BANKING RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE  AND GUARANTEES
4.7  The  most  pressing  problem  faced  by financially distressed countries
planning  to  stabilize  the  economy  is  how  to  avoid  a  banking  run  triggered  by  the
failure  of  banks  with  serious  liquidity  problems. In  several  developed  countries,
panics are avoided because the losses of insolvent financial institutions are
absorbed  by reserves  built up through  deposit  insurance  schemes. Most  developing
countries, however, lack these schemes and, in all cases of severe financial
crisis, losses are too high to be covered by any reasonably funded insurance
institution.  In such circumstances,  governments  are faced  with the decision of
whether to provide an ex post guarantee of deposits, or to risk a financial
debacle.  As a rule, governments prefer to guarantee ex post the deposits of43
weak  banks.  Recent  examples  of institutions  benefiting  from ex post deposit
guarantees  include  the  banking  system  in Chile,  the Continental  Illinois  Bank
in the  United  States, 20 and  several  banks  in  Colombia.
4.8  A substantial  body  of  opinion  maintains  that  granting  ex  post  deposit
insurance  is  a  mistake. Arguments  given  to support  this  opinion  are that:  (a)
it  reduces  financial  discipline  and  distorts  the  future  allocation  of  resources;
(b)  it  is  inequitable  because  it  forces  taxpayers  to  bear  the  losses  of  depositors
without  having  benefited  from their  gains;  and (c)  there are ways to avoid
demonetization  without insuring  all deposits,  such as insuring  only demand
deposits  or only  deposits  from  small  savers.
4.9  There  is  much  truth  to  the  first  argument.  By  bailing  out  depositors,
the  provision  of ex post deposit  insurance  distorts  the future  allocation  of
resources  in  the  economy  because  depositors,  confident  that  they  are  not  going
to lose  their  funds  in any  circumstance,  are  unlikely  to exert  control  on the
management  of  banks  by  shifting  their  deposits  to  the  best  managed  banks.  Instead,
they  are likely  to  deposit  in institutions  paying  the  highest  interest  rates,
which  normally  are  the  riskiest  ones. This  lack  of  control  becomes  more  evident
during  financial  crises. The  second  argument  is  also  powerful,  especially  when
other  sectors  in  the  economy  are  forced  to  take  losses.  The  third  argument  about
protecting  liquidity  through  ex post insurance  of only a portion  of deposits,
however,  is flawed.
4.10  The ability  of the economy  to make monetary  transactions  is not
protected  by  the  ex  post  insurance  of  demand  deposits  exclusively  because  different
kinds  of  financial  liabilities  are  close  substitutes  of  each  other.  Most  economic
agents  maintain  only  a  minimum  balance  in  their  current  accounts,  enough  to  carry
out  transactions  for  only  a  short  period  of  time,  because  other  deposits,  almost
as  liquid,  yield  higher  interest  rates. Financial  managers  of enterprises,  and
even personal  depositors,  transfer  funds  from  higher-yielding  instruments  to
demand  deposits  just  before  the  funds  are  needed. If,  when  banks  are  about  to
fail,  ex  post  insurance  is  granted  to  demand  deposits  only,  most  depositors  will
confront  a severe  shortage  of liquidity. If the  ex post insurance  is granted
when  banks  are  weak  but  bankruptcy  is  not imminent,  this  step  would  accelerate
20 Deposit  insurance  has existed  for  over  five  decades  in  the  U.S.  Throughout
this period,  insurance  had been limited  to depositors  holding a maximum  of
$100,000  in  the  insured  banks. However,  when  Continental  Illinois  was  about  to
fail  in  the  early  1980s,  the  Federal  Insurance  Deposit  Corporation  (FDIC)  decided
on ex post  guarantees  to depositors  with  more than  $100,000,  who  held  most of
the  bank's  liabilities.44
the  banks'  failure  because  funds  not  insureJ  and  not  needed  in  the  medium  term
would  be  withdrawn  and  invested  in  real  or  foreign  assets,  reducing  the  liquidity
of the  banking  system  and  creating  the  environment  of  a run.
4.11  Insuring  deposits  of  small  savers  only  makes  sense  if  it  is  provided
ex  ante  (before  any  crisis)  because  it  encourages  large  depositors  to  watch  where
they  deposit  their  money.  But if it is granted  ex post it would  not  protect
liquidity  because  there  is  no reason  to believe  that  small  depositors  provide
mosz  of the  liquidit:y  in  the  economy. On the  contrary,  chis  measure  would  also
precipitate  the  bankruptcy  of  the  banking  system,  because_  large  depositors  would
withdraw  their  funds  to deposit  them  abroad.
4.12  On  balan,:e,  given  the  extremely  high  cost  of bank  failures  and  bank
runs,  it seems  better  to grant  ex post insurance  to all deposits. The  wrong
signals  provided  by the  rescue  of depositors  can  be substantially  reduced  if
banks  are  bailed  or.t  but  bank owners  are  not.
C.  ALLOCATING  THE  LOSSES
Constraints
4.13  Once thet  need for  government  intervention  to allocat.e  the  losses  is
recognized,  the  political,  legal,  and  technical  problems  of  such  allocation  have
to  be  faced. First  and  foremost,  governments  should  aim  at  minimizing  the  fiscal
transfers  required  to restore  the  financial  health  of the country. Ideally,
government  transfers  should  not  exceed  the  amount  necessary  to  cover  the  losses
that  would  have  accrued  to  depositors  in  the  absence  of  intervention.  Therefore,
governments  must .. orce  the current  shareholeders  of debtor  firms  and creditor
banks to absorb  as much of the  losses  as possible,  either  by injecting  more
capital  in their Eirms  or by reducing  their  share  in their  firms'  ownership.
The  basic  principle  should  be that  intervention  must  be aimed  at saving  banks,
not  bank  owners,  and  firms,  not  firm  owners. Bank  and  firm  owners  must  be  saved
only  when,  as  discussed  in  Section  A  of  this  chapter,  their  survival  is  essential
for  the  operation  of viable  firms  or sectors.
4.14  There  are some factors  that  could limit  a government's  freedom  to
allocate  losses  in  the  least  costly  way,  among  them:  (a)  considerations  regarding
the  social  equity  of  the  allocation;  (b)  the  political  power  of  different  groups
to which  the  losses  could  be allocated;  (c)  the  legality  of different  ways  of
allocating  the losses;  and (d)  expediency. Equitable  and  efficient  solutions
may  not  be considered  politically  feasible;  also,  given  the  need for  speed,  it
may  be necessary  to adopt  second-best  solutions.45
4.15  The  external  debt  also  poses  an  important  restriction  on  the  allocation
of the  losses. Foreign  creditors  are  excluded  from  the  list  of  those  who  could
absorb  the losses  because  the  consequences  of an international  default  may be
as  dire  as  those  of  a  domestic  bank  run. Governments  have  negotiated  their  debts
several  times  over  with their  international  creditors,  obtaining  new loans  to
service  the  old ones,  in a process  that  closely  resembles  the  domestic  banks'
response  to  their  borrowers'  financial  distress.  While  the  build  up  of  reserves
carried  out recently  by Citicorp  could  start  a process  in  which  international
banks  will formally  absorb  losses,  the international  allocation  of losses  is
still  an open  issue.
Instruments
4.16  The  choice  of  the  mechanisms  through  which  resources  will  be  transferred
to  financially  distressed  economic  agents  is  a  key  decision  not  only  because  of
fiscal  equity,  but  also  because  the  mechanisms  affect  the  size  of the  transfers
themselves  and, therefore,  the amount  of losses  that has to be allocated.
Governments  can  choose  to  make  the  banks'  nonperforming  assets  good  by  transferring
resources  to  either  banks  or  borrowers.  In  both  cases,  the  transferred  resources
help  to  solve  the  banks'  problems,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  by increasing
the  borrowers'  ability  to  service  their  debts.
4.17  Transfers  to either  banks or borrowers  can oe effected  across  the
board (for  example,  by subsidizing  refinancing  of all credits  meeting  certain
requirements,  by condoning  specified  categories  of debts.  or  by purchasing  the
bad  portfolio  of all  banks),  case  by case,  or through  a  combination  of the  two.
Most of the mechanisms  for transferring  resources  can be used in both the
across-the-board  and  the  case-by-case  approach.  The  difference  between  the  two
approaches  is  the  discrimination  exerted  in  deciding  who the  beneficiaries  are
and  how  much  relief  is to  be provided  to each  of them.
4.18  The  across-the-board  approach  has  been tried  by several  governments
because  it  gives  the  appearance  of  being  faster  than  the  case-by-case  approach.
It is also  politically  appealing  because  it  makes  it easier  to conceal  who is
receiving  the  benefit  and  who foots  the  bill.  In some  cases,  governments  have
forgiven  part or all  of the  debt of some  sectors. These  cases,  however,  are
exceptional.  Most governments  using the across-the-board  approaeh  usually
transfer  resources  to  both  banks  and  borrowers  by providing  subsidized  credit
lines  and  by  establishing  preferential  exchange  rates  for  the  repayment  of  loans
denominated  in foreign  exchange.46
4.19  The across-the-board  approach  is quite inefficient. It tends  to
maximize  the amount  of government  resources  required  to solve the financial
crisis. There  are two  reasons  for this;  first,  a good  portion  of the  relief
goes  to agents  who do  not  need it,  providing  a  windfall  gain  to those  debtors;
and  second,  another  substantial  portion  of the  relief  goes  to agents  that  are
not  viable  regardless  of  the  amount  of  transfers  they  receive. If  transfers  are
designed  to help the average  debtor,  for example,  they  would  provide  various
degrees  of windfall  gains to half of the debtors  while leaving  unsolved  the
problems  of the  other  half.
4.20  Even  more important,  the  reduction  of the  financial  burden  of  viable
firms  and  banks  is  a  necessary,  but  not  a  sufficient,  condition  for  the  recovery
of the economy.  Typically,  firms  and  banks in financial  distress  also need
different  degrees  of  restructuring.  Such  restructurings  are  not  independent  of
financial  relief  schemes  and  cannot  be approached  in  a  wholesale  way.
General  Strategy
4.21  While  an across-the-board  approach  is too  costly  and  inefficient,  a
case-by-case  approach  may  prove  too  slow  because  of the  large  number  of firms
in need of restructuring. To speed up the process,  the government  should
decentralize  it as much as possible,  establishing  incentives  for the needed
restructurings  and getting  involved  only in those  restructurings  that  nobody
else  can  carry  out. In  this  vein,  the  government  can  use  banks  both  as  mechanisms
to provoke  the  complex  restructuring  of nonfinancial  firms  and  as vehicles  to
concentrate  the losses  in a limited  number of financial  institutions. In
restructurings  of  financial  institutions,  however,  the  government  may  be forced
to  play  a  more  active  role  because  it  is  the  only  agent  that  can  assume  the  share
of the  losses  that  bank shareholders  cannot  absorb. Using  this  strategy,  the
government  would  transfer  resources  only  to  banks,  strengthening  them  to  withstand
the  write-offs  needed  for  the  restructuring  of debtor  firms.
4.22  In addition  to  expediency,  there  are  two  other  powerful  reasons  why
the  government  should  limit  its  participation  in  the  restructuring  of  nonfinancial
firms  to that  of a facilitator.  First,  if the  government  becomes  involved  in
restructuring  decisions  that  entail  reducing  the  financial  burden  of debtors,
bankers  can reasonably  argue  that  they  are  not responsible  for  actions  forced
on  them  and,  therefore,  that  the  government  should  compensate  them  for  the  losses
resulting  from the negotiations.  Second,  restructurings  are likely  to be
negotiated  more  thoroughly,  and  therefore  more  efficiently,  if  they  are  carried
out  by  private  agents  exclusively  because  the  gains  of some  negotiators  will  be
the  losses  of the  others.47
4.23  Therefore,  the  government  should  create  incentives  to  provoke  a  process
of  debt  renegotiation  between  debtors  and  creditors.  Such  a  process  should  force
entepreneurs  to take their  share  of the losses,  eliminate  unviable  concerns,
reduce  the  financial  burden  of  viable  debtors,  and  transfer  the  remaining  losses
to  the  financial  system. At the  same  time,  the  government  should  recapitalize
the  banking  system.
D.  MACROECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  RECAPITALIZATION  OF  THE  BANKING  SYSTEM
Nominal  Domestic  Demand
4.24  The two  objectives  of stabilizing  the  economy  and  creating  an envi-
ronment  for  economic  recovery  are  consistent  in  the  medium  and  long  term  because
no sustainable  growth  is achievable  in  an unstable  environment. In the short
run,  however,  stabilization  requires  a contraction,  which  is likely  to affect
economic  growth  negatively. Furthermore,  since the continued  losses  of the
financial  system  are commonly  the single  most important  factor  in boosting
monetary  creation,  governments  should  include  the  recapitalization  and  improvement
of the  profitability  of  banks  in  their  stabilization  efforts.
4.25  Recapitalizing  the  banking  system  requires  a  transfer  of  real  resources
to banks,  and thus seems  to run  counter  to the  objective  of contracting  the
overall  growth  of nominal  domestic  demand. The  contradiction,  however,  is  only
apparent.  A recapitalization  of  weak  banks  would  not  increase  monetary  creation
because  the  banking  system's  losses  already  exist  and  are  being  financed  with
the  monetary  expansion  used to keep  insolvent  firms  in operation. Irnstead  of
financing  the insolvent  firms,  a comprehensive  program  of recapitalization  of
banks  would  finance  the  needed  write-offs.  This  action  would  cut  the  links  that
currently  force  banks to lend to inefficient  enterprises,  thus stopping  the
growth  of losses  and turning  weak banks into profitable  institutions. If
successful,  such  a  program  would  eliminate  one  of  the  main  sources  of  macroeconomic
instability.
4.26  Since  the  net result  of the  macroeconomic  policies  should  be con-
tractionary,  expenditures  on activities  that have less priority than the
recapitalization  of  the  banking  system  should  be  curtailed;  that  is,  subsidization
to  insolvent  borrowers  should  stop.  This  would  liberate  resources  to  recapitalize
the  banking  system,  to  reduce  the  rate  of  growth  of  nominal  domestic  demand,  and
to allocate  resources  for investment  and growth  in the private  sector.  In
countries  where  central  banks  are  su'ffering  valuation  losses,  reducing  government
expenditures  would  have  a double  benefit. First,  it  would  allow  central  banks48
to absorb  losses  without  generating  inflationary  pressures;  second,  by cutting
the rate of inflation,  it would  diminish  the  need for devaluation,  reducing
future  losses.
Speed  of  the  Process
4.27  The  recapitalization  of  banks  must  be  done  quickly  to  reduce  uncertainty
and remove  the negative  effect  of the crisis  on the stabilization  efforts.
However,  the transfers,  and their finanacing,  can be carried  out gradually,
spreading  the cash flow over several  years,  recapitalizing  the banks with
government  debt at market interest  rates.  Mechanisms  to carry out such a
recap!calization  are  discussed  in  Chapter  V. In  most  countries,  the  annual  cash
flow  should  not  exceed  2% of GDP,  which  represents  the  service  (interest  plus
amortization)  of  a  stock  of  debt  equivalent  to  25%  of  GDP  at  real  interest  rates
of about  5% over  20 years. This  is enough  to cover  even  a loss  of 50%  of the
portfolio  of  a  banking  system  with  credits  amounting  to  35-50%  of  GDP. A fiscal
contraction  of  2%  of  GDP,  however,  is  a  drastic  adjustment,  especially  when  other
adjustments  of the  same  or larger  order  of  magnitude  are  being  carried  out as
part  of an orthodox  stabilization  policy.
Impact  on the  Private  Sector
4.28  Intended  to reduce domestic  demand,  a contraction  in government
expenditures  would  impose  hardship  on the  private  sector. However,  unlike  tax
increases,  entepreneurs  can  avoid  this  hardship  by  exporting  or  by substituting
imports. The  shift  toward  exports  is,  of  course,  difficult  and  takes  time,  but
it is something  that distressed  countries  cannot  avoid.  The restructuring
strategy  should  be accompanied  by other  measures,  on  both  the  macroeconomic  and
the  sectoral  levels,  to  promote  exports.
E. STRUCTURAL  REFORM
4.29  In  most  countries  in  financial  crisis,  macroeconomic  adjustment  must
be coupled  with structural  reform  because  enterprise  restructuring  would  do no
good if  undertaken  in  a  highly  distorted  economic  environment.  The  nature  and
degree  of  the  required  structural  reform  will  vary  with  the  country.  In  general,
the  measures  must  seek  to  increase  the  role  of  the  market  in  allocating  resources.
4.30  Too fast a liberalization,  however,  could  prove to be unfeasible,
even  negative. However  distorted,  an established  economic  system  performs  an
immense  variety  of  functions  that  are  easy  to  overlook  when  planning  the  transition
to a radically  different  system.  Once the old structure  is removed,  the
institutions  needed  to  carry  out  many  of  these  functions  in  a  more  liberal  economy49
are  unlikely  to  exist.  Also,  the  liberalization  of  some  sectors  can  be  frustrated
by distortions  existing  in  others. For  example,  domestic  restrictions  on  trade
can frustrate  the  beneficial  effects  of external  trade  liberalization.  As a
result,  chaotic  situations  could  develop  after  a  too  ambitious  structural  reform.
4.31  Furthermore,  even  if  it  were  possible  to  plan  for  the  performance  of
all  the  required  functions  in  the  economy,  the  implementation  of  sweeping  reforms
is  likely  to  get  out  of  control,  both  because  people  need  time  to  become  familiar
with new  ways of doing  things  and  because  the  management  abilities  needed  to
give  a  sense  of  direction  to  radical  changes  can  exceed  the  country's  institutional
capabilities. This is especially  dangerous  in  countries  where the  government
capacity  would  already  be strained  by the  restructuring  effort.
4.32  Therefore,  the  structural  reforms  attached  to  a  restructuring  program
should  aim  at  attaining  only  the  liberalization  essential  to  stabilize  the  economy
and render  the productive  sectors  viable.  Once this objective  is attained,
further  structural  reforms  can  be carried  out  more gradually.
4.33  In  summary,  the  extremely  negative  consequences  of  banking  runs  make
it  desirable  to  intervene  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  banking  system. Such
intervention,  however,  makes it necessary  to intervene  further  to extinguish
uncollectible  cbligations  and  liberate  resources  for  economic  recovery  through
what  has  been called  the  allocation  of the  losses. In allocating  the  losses,
the  government  should  aim at decentralizing  the  restructuring  of debtor  firms
while  involving  itself  directly  only  in  the  restructur..ng  of  the  financial  sector.
To mobilize  the resources  needed  to restructure  financial  institutions  while
reducing  the  rate of growth  of nominal  domestic  demand,  the  government  should
reduce  its  expenditures  on items  of lower  priority.
V.  RESTRUCTURING
5.1  The  primary  objective  in  restructuring  is  to  reallocate  real  resources
in  accordance  with  a sustainable  structure  of  relative  prices,  so  that  economic
growth  can  resume. The  complementary  objective  is  to strengthen  the  financial
system  so  it  can  withstand  the  capital  losses  it  will  suffer  as  a result  of  such
reallocation,  without transferring  those losses  to depositors.  Governments
should  be  aware  that  restructuring  is  a  long  and  messy  process  that  will  require
taking  many  decisions  based  on  scant  information.  Restructuring  a single  major
bank  takes  years  even  in  a  developed  country,  as  the  case  of  Continental  Illinois
shows. In  a  developing  country  with  several  insolvent  banks,  the  process  could
take  even  longer  and  amountb  to  a  structural  adjustment.  The  only  justification
for  carrying  out  such  a difficult  process  is  that  the  alternatives  are  worse.50
5.2  The strategy  suggested  above,  decentralizing  the restructuring  of
debtor  firms  while  intervening  directly  in the  restructuring  of the  financial
sector,  is  general  enough  to  be implemented  in  any  country. The  particulars  of
this  implementation,  however,  will  vary  with  the  gravity  of the  crisis  and  the
institutional  characteristics  of  each  country.  Section  A  of  this  chapter  presents
a  stylized  program  of  restructuring  that  presupposes  the  existence  of  relatively
sophisticated  financial  institutions.  In  countries  where  such  institutions  do
not exist  or financial  markets  are too  shallow,  the  strategy  could  consist  of
mimicking  through  government  intervention  what  the  market  would  Go. Some  ideas
on such  a  mimicking  are  discussed  in  Section  B.
A. A  RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY FOR  COUNTRIES WITH RELATIVELY WELL DEVELOPED
FINANCIAL  SYSTEMS
Restructuring  Debtor  Firms
5.3  Debtor  firms  and  their  bankers  will  not  agree  to  absorb  losses  unless
they  are  convinced  that  they  have  no other  choice  and  that  it is  in their  best
interest  to stop  rollovers. The  best  way  to force  both  parties  to restructure
their  operations  is  to  put  pressure  on  the  banking  system  to  either  collect  their
loans  or  write  them  off.  This  action  would  break  the  collusion  of  debtors  and
creditors  that  is  one  of the  main  obstacles  to  restructuring,  setting  in  motion
a process  that  would  end  up  with the  renegotiation  of all  debts.
5.4  To  break  the  collusion  between  creditors  and  borrowers,  a  package  of
incentives  should  include  measures  that force  the  write-off  of bad loans  or,
when  a  xestructuring  has  taken  place,  the  write-off  of  the  portions  of  bad  debts
that  cannot  be recovered;  and  measures  that  upgrade  the  classification  of the
remaining  portion  of  restructured  debts  if  bank  examiners  are  satisfied  that  the
restructured  firms  are  financially  viable.
5.5  Firms  cannot  achieve  sustained  growth  if  the  service  of their  debts
is  higher  than,  or equal  to,  their  cash  generation.  Cash  sufficient  to obtain
financing  for replacing  equipment  and for investing  in the elimination  of
bottlenecks  and  on growth  should  stay  with  the  company. Therefore,  estimating
the  size  of the  financial  burden  that  must  be removed  to restore  the  health  of
a company  should  start  with  a projection  of the  cash  that  the  company's  assets
can generate  in a given  period,  say ten  years.  From that amount,  internal
resources  needed  for  equipment  replacement  and  new  investment  should  be  deducted.
The  present  value  of  the  remaining  cash  flow,  discounted  at  the  current  interest
rate,  is  the  amount  of  debt  that  the  company  can  service.  The  difference  between
the  current  stock  of  debt  and  this  present  value  must  be eliminated.51
5.6  In  countries  with  potential  for  developing  capital  markets,  reducing
the  financial  burden  of viable  debtors  can  be carried  out  by writing  off  bad
debts,  and  by  using  instruments  that  allow  banks  to  participate  in  the  restructured
debtor's  future  profits  and  cash  generation.  The  second  category  of  instruments
has  several  advantages.  If  restructured  firms  recover  and  grow,  the  additional
cash they generate  would reduce  the  banks'  long-run  losses.  Moreover,  this
approach  would  give  banks  an  incentive  to  restructure  the  ailing  firms  thoroughly
because  collecting  the  capitalized  portion  of  the  debt  would  depend  on  the  firm's
future  success.  Substituting  debt for equity,  however,  could transfer  the
ownership  of a substantial  portion  of the  productive  sectors  to the banking
system. This  would lead  to serious  conflicts  of interest  in  credit  decisions
and  could  result  in  another  debt  crisis  in  the  medium  term. Tihese  risks  should
be  reduced  by  forcing  the  banks  to  sell  their  ownership  claims  within  a  reasonable
period,  say  two  years.
5.8  The  use  of quasi-equity  can  also  help to  reduce  these  problems. In
order  to  be useful  in restructurings,  quasi-equity  instruments  should  be: (a)
subordinated  in  both service  and  repayment  of principal  (that  is,  the  service
and  repayment  of these  instruments  would  be contingent  upon  the  availability  of
resources  to  first  service  more  senior  debt);  (b)  convertible  into  shares  after
a specified  period  (five  to ten  years)  at a  predetermined  price  per  share;  and
(c)  negotiable. The interest  rate on the loans  backed  by these  instruments
should  be very low  or zero.  These  instruments  could  be made convertible  intc
nonvoting  or  preferred  stock  or,  alternatively,  banking  regulations  could  prevent
conversions  by financial  institutions.  In this  way, these  institutions  would
be able  to  obtain  the  eventual  capital  gains  only  by selling  the  instruments  to
other  parties.
5.9  The  use  of  equity  and  quasi-equity  instruments  also  presents  a  difficult
problem  of  valuation. Since  bank  examiners  do  not  have  a reliable  way  to  value
these  shares  in  the  banks'  assets,  the  estimation  of the  losses,  and  therefore
of the  amounts  needed  to recapitalize  weak  banks,  is subject  to larger  errors
when  these  instruments  are  used  than  when  they  are  not. This  delays  the  process
of  recapitalization  because  the  ultimate  extent  of  the  losses  cannot  be  estimated.
Therefore,  the  shorter  the  period  that  banks  are  allowed  to  keep  these  shares,
the  better.  On the other  hand, too  short  a period  could  be unfair  to banks
because  restructured  firms  need  some  time  to  prove  that  they  have  become  profitable.
On balance,  it seems  advisable  to  allow  banks  to hold  shares  for  a period  not
exceeding  two  years,  as  suggested  above. In  the  interim,  shares  should  be  valued
in  accordance  with  conservative  criteria,  the  goal  being  to  have  banks  carrying
them  on their  books  at  prices  close  to  zero.52
5.10  Since  firms  are typically  indebted  to several  banks,  the simplest
solution  would  be to  have  a  leading  bank  (the  one  most  exposed  to  the  respective
firm)  conduct  the  negotiations  with  debtors,  and  to  link  all  debts  of any  given
firm  through  cross-default  clauses.  Under  this  decentralized  framework,  bankers
would  decide  on  priorities,  then  allocate  the  most  time  and  their  most  qualified
executives  to the  more  important  debtors. The  restructuring  of less  important
debtors  could  be  negotiated  by  lower  executives  more  quickly,  in  accordance  with
rules  adopted  for  the  purpose.
Restructuring  Banks
5.11  Some  banks  will  not  be able  to absorb  their  losses  without  failing.
The  government  must  decide  whether  to  liquidate  them,  take  them  over,  or  negotiate
a  restructuring  plan  with  the  shareholders,  which  should  include  the  absorption
of losses  by these  sharehold;rs.  The  outcome  of this  decision  will  depend  on
the  gravity  of the  condition  of individual  banks,  on the  number  of  weak  banks,
and  on the  ability  of the  government  to  manage  banks. In  Chile,  where  all  but
one of the  local  private  banks  had lost  more than  twice  their  equity  capital,
the  government  decided  to take  over only the  worst  five  and recapitalize  the
rest  through  a  wholesale  scheme  that  saved  the  banks  but  forced  their  shareholders
to  take  most of their  losses  (para.  5.23).
5.12  Recapitalization  can  be  carried  out  through  different  mechanisms,  all
of them  variations  of three  main schemes:  (a)  increasing  the  profitability  of
financial  institutions;  (b)  purchasing  newly  issued  equity;  and (c)  purchasing
the  bad -ortfolio  at face  value.  In most cases,  the  best solution  will be a
combination  of the  three.
5.13  Increasing  the  Profitability  of Banks.  Instruments  used to improve
the  profitability  of  financial  institutions,  creating  artificial  conditions  for
profits  to rise,  have  already  been  discussed  in  Chapter  III  (paras.  3.22-3.24).
Their  use is  not  advisable. Controlling  interest  rates  to increase  the  spread
or extracting  high inflationary  taxes  to transfer  the proceeds  to banks are
inefficient  policies  that  tend  to exacerbate  the  problem  rather  than  solve  it.
5.14  There is some scope,  nevertheless,  to  help in the  recapitalization
of banks  by removing  distortions  that reduce  their  profitability. The main
actions  that  can  be taken  to attain  this  objective  are to lower  legal  reserve
requirements  and  forced  investments,  both of  which  reduce  the  profitability  of53
a portion  of a bank's  portfolio. 21 Increasing  the  profitability  of banks  by
eliminating  these  distortions  can,  however,  prove  to  be an  elusive  goal  because
banks  normally  compensate  for  them  by increasing  the  spread  on  other  operations.
In  those  cases,  reducing  forced  investments  or  legal  reserve  requirements  results
in spread  reductions,  not in increased  profitability. 22
5.15  Furthermore,  a  careful  distinction  must  be  made  between  legal  reserve
requirements  and forced  investments.  Reductions  in legal  reserve  requirements
increase  the  multiplier  of the  banking  system,  thus  increasing  the effect  of
reserve  money creation  on nomtnal  domestic  demand  and lessening  the central
bank's  ability  to  finance  the  government  with  a  given  amount  of  monetary  creation.
Therefore,  they  can  be safely  reduced  only  in combination  with a simultaneous
contraction  of the  fiscal  deficit  or  a  shift  of government  sources  of  financing
toward  open  market  operations.  Forced  investments,  in  contrast,  can  be reduced
without  monetary  impact,  provided  that  the  rediscounts  they  finance  are  reduced
simultaneously. Reductions  of forced  investments,  and the rediscounts  they
finance,  could  be difficult  if rediscounts  have  long  maturities.
5.16  This  discussion  should  not  be  interpreted  as  an  argument  to  keep  legal
reserve  requirements  and  forced  investments  at  excessive  levels  but  as  a  warning
that  reductions  should  be carried  out  carefully  and  that  they  may  not  result  in
improving  the  profitability  of  banks. Lower  spreads  help  in  reducing  financial
distress  because  they  lower  the  loan  interest  rate  that  banks  have to  charge  at
any  given  deposit  rate.  Also,  reductions  in forced  investments  reduce  mark!t
fragmentation  and improve  the  allocation  of resources.
5.17  Purchasing  Newly  Issued  Equity  Shares. This is  the  more  direct  way
to  recapitalize  banks. Ideally,  the  new  shares  should  be bought  voluntarily  by
private  investors.  However,  to  sell  shares  of  a  bank  in  the  process  of  writing
off  its  equity  capital  may  be impossible.  In  these  circumstances,  the  government
may perform  the role  of intermediary,  purchasing  the shares,  cleaning  up the
bank's  portfolio,  and then  selling  the shares  of a newly  healthy  bank to the
21  The terms  "legal  reserve  requirements"  and  "forced  investments"  are  used in
the  text  to distinguish  between  two  types  of deposits  that  banks  have to keep
with  central  banks.  Both  detract  from  the  funds  available  to  banks  for  investment,
but their  use  by central  banks is  different. Legal  reserve  requirements  are
sterilized  and, therefore,  give room for  central  banks  to finance  government
deficits. Forced  investments  are returned  to the banking  system  to finance
specific  activities,  at preferential  interest  rates  and  maturities.
22 The  profitability  of banks  will increase  only  to the  extent  that  they  have
oligopolistic  power. Otherwise,  competition  will  reduce  the  spread.54
public. If  the  bank  has  lost  more  than  its  equity  capital,  the  government  will
take  a  loss. To  minimize  such  a  loss,  the  government  should  purchase  the  shares
only  after  forcing  the  required  write-offs.
5.18  Purchasing  the  Bad  Portfolio.  If  the  weak  bank  has  lost  substantially
more than its  equity  capital,  recapitalization  through  the  purchase  of equity
shares  exclusively  would  leave  the  bank  with a low  debt-to-equity  ratio,  which
would impair  its  profitability. In these  cases,  portfolio  purchases  are the
more expeditious  instrument. As in the  case of the  purchase  of newly  issued
shares,  the government  should  proceed  with the  purchase  of the  bad portfolio
only  after  forcing  the  banks'  owners  to  take  their  share  of  the  loss. This  can
be accomplished  if the  government  has already  purchased  the  bank through  the
process  described  in  the  previous  paragraph.  The  same  result  can  also  be  obtained
in other  ways.  In Chile,  the  government  purchased  the  bad portfolio  of most
banks  under  a scheme  that  forced  bank owners  to take  a portion  of the losses
without  having  to  nationalize  the  banks  (para.  5.27-5.28).
5.19  The government  should  purchase  the  worst  portion  of the  portfolio,
that  with a  very low  probability  of collection.  Otherwise,  the  purchase  would
not fulfill  its  objective  of substituting  good  for  bad assets  in the  banking
system. The  purchase  should  be carried  out,  therefore,  only  after  the  bank  has
gone through  the  restructuring  of its  customers'  debts  and the  uncollectible
part  of their  obligatio  ns  ha-s beer.  identified.
5.20  Form of Payment.  The  best way to  pay for the  recapitalization  of
banks  is through  long-term  negotiable  government  bonds  paying  floating  market
interest  rates.  Such  bonds  should  provide  income  slightly  lower  than that  of
loans,  so that there  is an incentive  for  banks to gradually  sell them  to the
public  to  get  resources  for  lending.  The  macroeconomic  impact  of  these  instruments
is  discussed  in  para.  4.27.
5.21  Management  Restructuring.  To  ensure  the  strengthening  of  the  financial
system,  it  is  necessary  to  force  the  restructuring  of  the  financial  institutions
themselves  as a requisite  for  helping  in their  recapitalization.  It is not
enough  that  the  owners  of  financial  Institutions  take  their  share  of  the  losses.
Also,  the  managers  of  banks  in  serious  distress  should  be removed,  even  if  their
institutions  are  not taken  over  by government  agencies.
5.22  The  issue  of  the  management  of  banks  is  different  from  that  of firms
on the  real  side  of the  economy  (paras.  4.4-4.6),  both  because  the  reasons  for
replacing  them are stronger  and  because  their  replacement  is easier. When a
financial  institution  gets  in  serious  trouble,  a  stvle  of  management  (concealing
losses,  disregarding  prudent  financial  practices)  emerges  that  is  impossible  to55
correct  without  removing  the  managers. The problems  posed  by bringing  in new
managers  in  the  financial  sector  are  less  severe  than  in the  industrial  sector
because,  typically,  the  number  of failed  banks  is  much smaller  than  the  number
of  debtors,  and  because  managing  one  bank is  quite  similar  to  managing  the  next
one.
5.23  Even if these  factors  make it more desirable  and more feasible  to
remove  the  top  managers  of  financial  institutions  than  to  remove  their  counterparts
in  industrial  firms,  the  substitution  of  all  the  top  managers  of  weak  banks  could
prove  inconvenient  or impossible  in  cases  of  widespread  solvency  problems. In
Chile,  for  example,  this  would  have  entailed  the  removal  of the  top  executives
of  all  locally  owned  private  banks  except  one. The  government  decided  to  remove
the managers of  only the  five worst banks while forcing administrative
restructurings  through  the  superintendency  of  banks.
5.24  Government-Owned  Banks. In  several  countries,  government-owned  banks
are among  the  weakest  financial  institutions  because  they  have acted  more as
channels  to convey  subsidies  and  political  favors  than  as financial  concerns.
Solving  the  financial  crisis  requires  either  liquidating  these  banks  or turning
them  into  efficient,  profitable  institutions.  To  accomplish  the  latter  objective,
it is  necessary:  (a)  to  make  the  managers  of  banks  accountable  for  their  banks'
profitability  and  discard  the  use  of banks  as generators  of subsidies;  (b)  to
.''L  L  t;  L  .LV  Ua  Lt  Ur  .=  .!L.e.;&_OLU  I  --  U!-,l-  a  ncy  criteria  in
determining  both  the  quality  of  their  portfolios  and  the  income  these  portfolios
generate;  and  (c)  to  improve  profitability  through  better  management  and  through
ensuring  that  managers  have complete  freedom  in  administering  their  assets.
The  Concentration  of Losses
5.25  As a result  of bank recapitalizations,  the  government  would end  up
owning  substantial  assets,  which can  comprise  bank shares  and a sizable  non-
performing  portfolio. The market  value  of these  assets  will be considerably
lower than their  book value,  the difference  being the loss absorbed  by the
government.  Ideally,  such  a  loss  should  be  equal  to  the  amount  needed  to  protect
depositors  exclusively.  The  government  must  then  decide  what  to do  with these
assets.
5.26  In  the  case  of  shares,  the  government  should  sell  them  to  the  private
sector  as soon  as  possible. In  the  case  of  bad  loans,  the  government  has three
alternatives:  to  keep  them  and  try  to  collect  as  much  as  possible;  to sell  them
to private investors;  and to sell them back to the banks' owners  under a
repurchasing  agreement  with a long-term  maturity. Of the  first  two  courses  of
action,  the second  is the preferred  one because  governments  do not have a56
comparative  advantage  in  collecting  difficult  loans. The third  alternative  is
qualitatively  different  from  the  other  two  because,  in  the  long  run,  it  attempts
to pass the cost of restructuring  back to the  banks'  owners  and, unlike  the
purchase  of shares,  can  be applied  across  the  board.
5.27  The  third  option was  the  one  adopted  in  Chili2  to  deal  with  the  banks
that  the  government  decided  not  to take  over. 23 The  ouners  of  banks  benefiting
from  the  central  bank's  purchases  of  bad  loans  committed  their  share  of future
profits  to  repurchasing  those  loans  from  the  central  bank,  at  face  value,  thereby
promising  to absorb  the  losses  incurred  by the  central  bank.  The  repurchasing
obligation  does  not affect  the  banks'  balance  sheet  because  it is  burdened  on
their  profits,  which  are, in  any  case,  liable  to be distributed  as dividends.
To  avoid  stopping  the  growth  of  banks,  the  scheme  did  not  impose  the  repurchasing
obligation  on  new  shares  issued  after  the  recapitalization  was  completed.  While
the  market  price  of  the  old  shares,  which  will  not  generate  profits  for  decades,
fell  to  almost  zero,  new  shares  are  attractive  because  they  are  not  encumbered.
The  profits  of  banks  will  be  allocated  proportionally  between  old  and  new  shares;
those  accrued  to  the  new  shares  will  be distributed  as  dividends,  whereas  those
accrued  to  the  old  shares  will  be  used  to  repurchase  the  bad  debt  from  the  central
bank.
5.28  The  Chilean  scheme  was  favorable  to  the  original  shareholders  because
it allowed  them  to  keep  A  shar=  of the b_n's  ownership; i;i  contrast,  a direct
government  intervention  after  forcing  write-offs  would  have eliminated  their
claims  altogether  (since  losses  exceeded  the  book  value  of  equity).  At the  same
time,  the  scheme  imposed  an  obligation  on the  shareholders  to  cover  100%  of the
losses,  even  though  their  ownership  responsibility  was limited  to the  size  of
the  equity  capital. Furthermore,  the  normal  growth  of  banks  through  new  equity
issues  will dilute  the  share  held  by the  original  owners. There  is a danger
that,  if  the  original  owners  continue  to  manage  the  bank,  they  will  try  to  extract
income  from  the  banks. This  danger  can  be reduced  with  strict  supervision  and
by  encouraging  the  incorporation  of  new  capitalists  into  the  restructured  banks,
something  that  can  be achieved  through  enforcing  maximum  debt-to-equity  ratios.
Institutional  Aspects
5.29  A successful  restructuring  program  needs  a  substantial  institutional
basis,  which  may  not  exist  in  developing  countries.  The institutional  changes
that  are  most  commonly  needed  are: (a)  establishing  prudential  regulation  and
23  The  solution  applied  to  the  intervened  banks  was  a  combination  of this  scheme
with the  purchase  of shares  by the government. The shares  were subsequently
sold  to  private  investors.57
supervision  to force  banks  to  take  their  losses;  (b)  revamping  bankruptcy  laws
to  force  debtor  firms  to  take  their  losses;  (c)  establishing  an  agency  to  handle
bank  restructurings;  and  (d)  developing  capital  markets  to  unload  the  securities
generated  by restructurings.
5.30  Prudential  Regulation  and  Supervision.  Legislative  changes  are  needed
in  some  countries  to  force  banks  to  take  the  losses  and  initiate  the  restructuring
process.  To  induce  restructurings,  banking  regulations  should  set  up  strict  norms
for the classification  of loans  by quality;  force  banks to stop accrual  of
interest  on  nonperforming  loans  after  90  days  of arrears;  and  establish  a  clear
procedure  for  building  up adequate  provisions  for  writing  off  bad  loans. Also,
in most countries,  measures  are needed  to improve  supervision. Supervisory
agencies  should  be given  the  power  to enforce  regulations,  including  powers  to
remove  bank managers  and members  of the  board.  In addition,  the skills  and
training  of supervisors  should  be improved,  and a good information  system  to
monitor  banks  should  be established.
5.31  Bankruptcy  Laws.  Another  common  obstacle  to restructurings  is the
desire  to  protect  debtors  excessively.  Bankruptcy  laws  commonly  include  provisions
to  protect  financially  distressed  firms  from  their  creditors,  allowing  them  time
to reorganize  themselves  and  renegotiate  their  debts.  If,  at the  end  of this
period,  the firm  does  not  become  viable,  bankruptcy  procedures  are initiated.
The  principle  behind such legislation is  sound,  boUt  th;.  rizsk  iS th__t  b-ro  ca
stop  payments  for  a  prolonged  period  without  having  to  increase  their  efficiency
and  without  reaching  an agreement  with  their  creditors.  As a  result,  financial
discipline  is  weakened  and  restructurings  become  difficult. In  such  cases,  the
protection  of debtors  against  creditors  must  be reduced.
5.32  The Deposit  Insurance  Corporation. The agency  in charge  of bank
restructurings  should  be managed  by the  government  in a decentralized  fashion,
without  the  bureaucratic  encumbrances  of central  government  instItutions.  They
should  be able  to take over,  recapitalize,  and  sell  banks  back to the  private
sector  without  nationalizing  them  in  the  process.  Deposit  insurance  corporations
are among  the most effective  agencies  to handle  restructurings  of financial
institutions  because  they  can  operate  under  private  sector  laws. Creating  such
a corporation  to  handle  a banking  crisis  has the  double  benefit  of preventing
bank  runs  and  providing  an institutional  instrument  to  restructure  the  banks.
5.33  To  perform  bank  restructurings,  a  deposit  insurance  corporation  should
have  several  characteristics.  It  should  insure  deposits  of  both  government-owned
and  private  banks  so it is  able  to restructure  both.  It should  have  the  power
to take  over the  management  of  weak  banks,  both  private  and government-owned.58
In  the  case  of  private  banks,  it  should  also  be  able  to  become  the  owner.  Finally,
it should  be forced  by law  to sell  back the  restructured  private  banks  to the
private  sector.
5.34  Capital  Markets.  The  process  of  restructuring  described  in  the  previous
paragraphs  would  generate  a  substantial  amount  of  securities,  some  of  them  issued
by debtor  firms  and  the  rest  by the  restructured  banks. Considering  the  small
size of capital  markets  in even the  most sophisticated  developing  countries,
unloading  these  securities  can  be expected  to  be a  major  task.
5.35  The shares  of restructured  banks  are  better  handled  through  private
placements  controlled  by the  deposit  insurance  corporation  or  by an equivalent
government  agency  in  charge  of  bank  restructurings.  The  natural  purchasers  of
the  shares  of  banks  are  healthy  banks  interested  in  merging  with  the  restructured
banks. 24  If there  are  no domestic  banks  available  for  mergers,  the  government
can  try to entice  international  banks  to  purchase  the  restructured  banks.  If
these  efforts  fail,  the  government  may try  to sell the  banks  to newly formed
banking  corporations.  To  promote  these  operations,  the  government  normally  has
to  offer  good  selling  conditions  and  provide  long-term  financing.  In  Chile,  for
example,  the government  sold the shares  of restructured  banks to income  tax
payers  at  heavily  subsidized  prices.
5.36  Unloading  the  shares  of  restructured  companies  poses  a  more  complicated
problem  because  of the  number  of companies  and the  amounts  involved. In some
countries,  there  is an incipient  capital  market  that can  be strengthened  to
handle at least a portion of the securities  that become available  through
restructurings.  Capital  markets  in  developing  countries  are  often  weak  because
the  tax  structure  discriminates  against  equity  share  investments  and  because  the
rights  of minority  shareholders  are not adequately  protected.  In addition,
institutional  investors  are lacking  because  pension  funds  are managed  by the
state  and  life  insurance  companies  are  forced  to  invest  in  government  documents.
Taking  measures  to solve  these  problems  may help to increase  the size  of the
market,  which  would  also  be  enhanced  by  the  possibilities  of  large  capital  gains
in  buying  shares  of restructured  companies.
B.  ALTERNATIVE  SCHEMES  FOR COUNTRIES WITH LESS  DEVELOPED FINANCIAL  SYSTEMS
5.37  In most countries,  the  development  of capital  markets  may take  too
long  for  them  to  play  a  significant  role  in  restructurings.  Also,  negotiations
24 Some  mergers  between  restructured  banks  may  be necessary  in  order  to reduce
the  number  of institutions  that  have  to  be sold  back  to  the  private  sectors  and
to improve  their  efficiency.  These  mergers  can  be carried  out  by the  agency  in
charge  of the  restructurings.59
between  debtors  and  creditors  may  be  complicated  in  countries  where  the  government
owns  both  of them.  Furthermore,  in  some  countries,  banks  may lack  the  sophis-
tication  required  to negotiate  restructurings. In Lich  cases,  the suggested
restructuring  strategy  may  need  to  be substantially  modified.
5.38  In countries  that are financially  less sophisticated,  the  sale of
equity  or  quasi-equity  instruments  may  be impossible.  The  government  may  instead
choose  one  of two  options:  to  discard  the  use  of these  instruments  in  restruc-
turings,  or to acquire  them  from  banks  as  part of the  banks'  recapitalization
program  and  give  them  away  to  taxpayers.
5.39  Another  solution  that  is  sometimes  recommended  is  for  the  government
to keep the shares  through  a state-owned  holding  company.  This solution  is
risky,  however,  because  the government  would then  hold a large  share  of the
ownership  of the  productive  sectors. The  pressure  to  protect  these  companies
from  market  risks  could  prove  great.  Should  the  government  give in to those
pressures,  it could  render  useless  the  whole  restructuring  exercise.
5.40  Still  another  alternative  could  be for  banks to acquire  equity  or
quasi-equity  instruments  under  repurchasing  agreements  similar  to  those  used  in
Chile  for the recapitalization  of banks (para.  5.27). This option  should  be
used  cautiously,  however,  because  it  can  create  strong  incentives  for  companies
to falsify financial statements and to transfer  assets  to  xtw,  en,CGr  e
companies.  While  this  problem  is  manageable  with  a  limited  number  of  banks,  it
may  be beyond  control  when  dealing  with  a large  number  of debtor  companies.
VI. CONCLUSION
6.1  The financial  distress  that  has  been the subject  of this  paper  has
had  no  precedents  since  the  1930s,  either  in terms  of the  gravity  of  individual
cases  or in terms  of the  number  of countries  affected. The  emergence  of these
problems  and  their  concentration  in  countries  that  have  followed  an  inward-oriented
strategy  of  development  suggest  that  such  a  strategy  is  becoming  unviable  in  the
modern  world.
6.2  Financial  distress  arose  as a result  of the  increasing  inability  of
countries  to  maintain  structures  of  protection  that  severely  distorted  relative
prices. Devaluations  and scarcities  of imported  inputs  turned  unprofitable  a
substantial  portion  of  the  assets  of  these  countries,  causing  considerable  capital
losses  that were reflected  in a deterioration  of the quality  of the banks'
portfolios.  Both the internal  dynamics  of protectionism  and international
developments  contributed  to  these  events.60
6.3  Protectionism  proved  unstable  because  it resulted  in the  following
chain  of events:  (a)  it gradually  led  to balance-of-payments  problems  because
it discouraged  exports  while encouraging  imports  of production  inputs;  (b)
protectionism  made  production  a  function  of  domestic  demand  almost  exclusively,
which  put  pressure  on governments  to try  to maintain  high rates  of growth  for
this  demand,  regardless  of the  balance-of-payments  problems;  (c)  high rates  of
growth  of nominal  domestic  demand  led, initially,  to large  external  borrowing
and,  when foreign  credits  were  not available,  to  high rates  of inflation;  and
(d)  through  this  process,  high  rates  of  nominal  domestic  demand  also  led  to  low
rates  of real  production  because  they  caused  the  balance-of-payments  problems,
and,  therefore,  the  resulting  shortage  of  imported  inputs  needed  for  production.
As a result  of such dynamics,  countries  following  strategies  that were too
protectionist  were bound to have financial  problems,  even in the absence  of
external  developments.
6.4  International  developments  a'.so  made it more difficult  to maintain
distorted  structures  of relative  prices.  Some of these developments  were
circumstantial.  like  the  pronounced  cycle  that  has  characterized  commodity  prices
and  international  interest  rates  since  the  early  1970s. Others  are  structural,
the  result  of the  growing  internationalization  of the  world  economy,  the  rapid
development  of  technology,  and  the  shift  in  consumption  patterns  that  is  occurring,
in part  because  of the  technological  revolutiorn,  in the  largest  ma-rkets  'n  the
world.  It seems  that  commodities  are  becoming  an inferior  good  as a growing
portion  of  the  developed  economies  income  is  being  spent  in  high-tech  consumption
and  investment  goods.
6.5  Excessive  levels  of  external  indebtedness,  the  result  of  the  domestic
problems  described  in the  previous  paragraph,  delivered  the  main blow to the
inward-oriented  model  of  development.  Countries  need  to  generate  fore-Mn  exchange
not  only to service  the  large  debt  but also to pay for imports  of investment
goods  that  formerly  were  financed  with  external  borrowing. To servtc-  the  debt
and  finance  economic  growth,  protection  has  to  be  reduced  and  economic integrated
into  the  world  markets.
6.6  While  the  capital  loss  caused  by shifts  in  relative  prices  cannot  be
avoided  because  it  has  already  occurred,  distressed  countries  can  keep  the  losses
from  swelling  by  stopping  the  allocation  of  resources  to  unprofitable  activities
and  by creating  the  right  conditions  for  resources  to flow  to activities  that
could  spur  economic  recovery. If  countries  try  to ignore  the  original  capital
loss,  however,  losses  are increased  and  recovery  is delayed  because  efficier.t
companies  are  crowded  out  by inefficient  ones.61
6.7  This paper  ceiries  two important  messages. The first  is that the
solution  to  financial  dist,:ess  consists  of  recognizing  the  losses  explicitly  and
of allocating  them. Through  this  process,  the  links  existing  between  banks  and
inefficient  enterprises  are  cut,  thereby  allowing  resources  to  flow  to  profitable
activities.  This  process  should  be accompanied  by structural  reforms  to  ensure
that  the  new  activities  will  be competitive  internationally  and  to  enhance  the
flexibility  of the  economy  in adjusting  to changing  international  conditions.
6.8  The  second  message  is  that  the  ultimate  cause  of financial  distress,
the  failure  of the  distressed  economies  to  adapt  to changing  circumstances,  is
evident  in  several  countries  that  are  not  suffering  from  macroeconomic  instability.
These  countries  are following  a path similar  to the  one  followed  by those  now
in distress:  the maintenance  of excessively  high rates of growth  of nominal
domestic  demand,  financed  with  external  borrowing. The  high rate  of growth  of
nominal  domestic  demand  is,  to  a  large  extent,  the  result  of  government  efforts
to keep inefficient  firms  and  activities  in  operation. If the  governments  of
these  countries  do not take  corrective  action  in  time,  they  too  will be faced
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